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How Imperial Is the Supreme Court? An 
Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion 
Doctrine and Popular Will 
By MICHAEL VmELLo* 
Q UR HISTORY IS replete with attacks on the Supreme Court for 
frustrating the will of the majority. 1 Depending on the era, the at-
tacks have come both from the left and from the right. President 
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, for example, was a reaction to the 
several Supreme Court decisions striking down New Deal legislation-
legislation presumably supported by a majority of Americans.2 More 
recently, the sharpest criticism of the Court has come from the right. 
Introduction 
Former Judge Robert Bork voiced current anti-Court sentiment 
when he stated that, 'judicial activism is likely to represent an elite 
minority's sentiment."3 Similarly, other conservatives have attacked 
the Court as elitist, socially permissive, and out of touch with the ma-
jority of Americans.4 Criticism has come from within the Court as well. 
Justice Scalia has accused the Court of substituting its will for that of 
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; J.D., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to extend special 
thanks to Dean Gerald Caplan for his continued support of scholarship at McGeorge. I am 
also appreciative of the excellent research assistance and feedback provided by Lesley C. 
Barlow, Jenna L. Clark, Dale R. Gomes, and Maria Salazar-sperber and of Ms. Clark's 
special efforts in pushing the project to completion. 
1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 ( 1992) (Scalia, 
]., dissenting) (declaring that "[t]he Imperial judiciary lives"). 
2. See joHN E. NowAK ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 147-48 (3rd ed. 1986). President 
Roosevelt's proposal was entitled "Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary." See S. 1392, 
75th Cong. (1937). 
3. RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING oF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEoucnoN oF THE 
LAw 17 (1990). 
4. See jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the Culture War.s, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 105 (1998); 
see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia,]., dissenting) (stating that the 
Supreme Court is a participant in the "culture wars" that divide America and that "in these 
conflicts, the Court is a systematic partisan for one side-the liberal side"). 
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the voters. In Romer v. Evans,5 he accused the Court of "imposing 
upon all Americans" the values of "the elite class from which the Mem-
bers of this institution are selected."6 Like Bork, Scalia sees America 
engaged in a cultural war in which the Supreme Court sides with the 
elite class and is thus at odds with the majority of Americans.' 
Long ago, Justice Frankfurter urged the Supreme Court to act 
with restraint in order to preserve its limited popular support.8 
Although the Court's critics cite no empirical support for their view,9 
the Court often ignores the claim that its rulings lack popular sup-
port.10 The traditional defense disregards the fact that, despite the 
rhetoric, the Court cannot frustrate the majority will often or for pro-
longed periods of time. Various institutional or constitutional factors 
prevent the Court from straying too far from popular will. 11 
The current attack on the Court runs as follows: insofar as the 
justices subscribe to the notion of a living Constitution, the Court is 
not constrained by constitutional text or history. Thus, justices substi-
tute their preferences for those of duly elected legislatures and 
thereby deprive Court rulings of legitimacy.12 This article challenges 
the critics' claim in reference to one particularly controversial area of 
the law-abortion. 
Through analysis of opinion polls over the last quarter-century, 
this article concludes that the attack on the Court is unfounded. t 3 
While Court doctrine on abortion does not entirely mirror public 
opinion, it does significantly reflect popular will.14 In fact, where pub-
5. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
6. /d. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7. Ste id. at 636-53 (Scalia,J., dissenting); see also Rabkin, supra note 4, at105. 
8. See Mary B. McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of 'Our Federalism,' 27 CAL. 
RE.v. 697, 731-37, 780-83 (1993) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial 
restraint); but see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism, 92 Nw. U.L. RE.v. 
251, 276-77 (1997) (stating that Frankfurter used restraint selectively, depending on the 
issue before the Court); see also Fred Rodell, Book Review, 59 YALE LJ. 1013, 1014-15 
(1950) (stating that Frankfurter used restraint selectively). 
9. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ; see 
also BoRK, supra note 3, passim. 
10. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
11 . See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text. 
12. See BORK, supra note 3, at 46 (noting that, "[t]here was no Justice on the Court 
who was not prepared to substitute his opinions for those of elected representatives at 
some point~}. 
13. See discussion infra Part IV. 
14. See id. 
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lie opinion is clearest, the Supreme Court doctrine is most likely to 
parallel that sentiment.15 
This conclusion is important because it supports the wisdom of 
the creation of an independent judiciary. Repeated attacks on the 
Court as anti-majoritarian risk eroding public support for an in-
dependent judiciary. This attack is especially dangerous in the emo-
tionally charged abortion debate. 
Part I of this article discusses the critique of the Supreme Court 
as an anti-majoritarian institution. Part II shows the development and 
current state of the Supreme Court's abortion case law. Part III dis-
cusses the adequacy of using public opinion polls to measure majority 
sentiment. Part IV compares the Supreme Court's abortion doctrine 
with polling results over time and concludes that a majority of Ameri-
cans have supported the general scheme of the Supreme Court's abor-
tion doctrine. 
I. The Anti-Majoritarian Debate 
To hear Justice Scalia16 or Robert Bork17 tell it, the Supreme 
Court acts with little legitimacy because it routinely frustrates the will 
of the majority when it strikes down popular legislation. The Court's 
defenders concede this point, but defend the Court as an institution 
designed to protect minority rights. 18 This section reviews this debate 
and argues that however desirable it may be to have a court positioned 
to protect "discrete and insular minorities"19 unable to achieve polit-
ical power, the Court is far less anti-majoritarian than its critics claim. 
The debate surrounding the Court often contrasts independent Arti-
cle IIIjudges,20 considered members of the elite, with the legislature, 
considered the true measure of popular sentiment.21 In fact, the legis-
lature often acts contrary to popular will. Failure to recognize that the 
15. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
16. SeeRomerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,636-53 (1996) (Scalia, ]., dissenting). 
17. See BaRK, supra note 3, at 16-17. 
18. See infra note 34. 
19. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) . 
20. Compare Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1120-21 (1977) 
(stating that, "the federal judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures makes federal 
court structurally preferable to state uial court"), with Michael E. Solimine & James L. 
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of judicial 
Parity, 10 HAsTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 213 (1983) (arguing that empirical data suggest paricy 
between state and federal judges in their willingness to enforce federal rights). 
21. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520-21 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) [hereinafter Akron /1] . 
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Court does in fact follow majority will leaves the Court open to power-
ful attack that may undercut its effectiveness.22 
A. The Attacks: The Supreme Court Frustrates Majority Will 
At various times in our history, Congress and the President, frus-
trated by rulings of the Supreme Court, have proposed legislation 
aimed at undercutting the authority of the federal courts. President 
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme,23 various proposals in the 1950s 
and 1960s ranging from desegregation to school prayer and busing,24 
designed to undo Warren Court decisions, and a host of similar stat-
utes in the early Reagan years share a common thesis:25 the Article III 
judiciary is politically unaccountable and often frustrates the will of 
the majority. 
No doubt, the Court has acted contrary to majoritarian senti-
ment. Doing justice in a given case may demand a blind eye towards 
popular will.26 For example, assuring that the government provides 
due process to a death row inmate may frustrate majoritarian senti-
ment. The fact that the Supreme Court repeatedly acted in contraven-
tion of popular will in striking down New Deal legislation in the mid-
1930s is beyond serious historical debate. Furthermore, a majority of 
Americans undoubtedly opposed many of the Warren Court decisions 
that bound the States to specific protections found in the Bill of 
Rights. 
Even the Court's sharpest critics recognize a role for judicial in-
dependence and do not contend the Court must always respond to 
22. See discussion infra Pan IV; see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia,]., concurring and dissenting; joined by Rehnquist, CJ.); see 
also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
23. Ste NowAK ET AL, supra note 2, at 147-48. President Roosevelt's proposal was enti-
tled "Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary." SeeS. 1392, 75th Cong. (1937). 
24. See GERALD GuNTitER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: CAsES AND MATERIAI..S 58-59 (9th ed. 
1975); see also Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the 
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 Vn.L. L. REv. 988, 988 (1981-82). 
25. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail FedRral Court jurisdiction: An opin-
ionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 895-96 (1984) (discussing Con-
gressional proposals aimed at curbing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in light 
of dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions, and particularly mentioning abortion and 
busing). 
26. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SuFFOLK U. L. 
REv. 751, 751 (1986) (noting that the courts must decide cases free from popular 
pressure) . 
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popular sentiment.27 Instead, their contention is that, because activist 
justices are not constrained by the text or original meaning of the 
Constitution, those justices are substituting their own value prefer-
ences for those of the majority.28 According to Bork and other critics, 
substituting the values of the cultural elite is not legitimate because 
those values lack constitutional or majoritarian support.29 Often, the 
critics cite Roe v. Wade30 and the Supreme Court's privacy case law as 
prime examples of the justices' substitution of their values for those of 
the majority. 31 
In fact, few issues have generated such constant attack on the 
Court as abortion. The criticism began with Justice White's dissent in 
Roe which characterized the majority's holding as "an exercise of raw 
judicial power."32 Since then, criticism of Roe has focused on a 
number of arguments. Chief among these criticisms has been the 
claim that unelected judges have frustrated the majority's will as re-
flected in state anti-abortion legislation.33 The portrayal of unelected, 
27. See id. at 752 ("No such judge can conscientiously say in so many words, 'I gave you 
my best judgment when I decided that the Constitution meant thus and so, but since the 
public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution, I will there-
fore change my mind' "). 
I d. 
28. See BoRK, supra note 3, at 170. Bork states: 
Again, the idea is not that judges should feel free to alter the composition of the 
House of Representatives or decide that senatorial elections should occur every 
two years but that they should be free to create new individual rights and so strike 
down legislation that would be valid under the Constitution as written. 
29. See id. at 171 ("The dead, and unrepresentative, men who enacted our Bill of 
Rights and the Civil War amendments did not thereby forbid us, the living, to add new 
freedoms. We remain entirely free to create all the additional freedoms we want by consti-
tutional amendment or by simple legislation ... "). 
30. 410 u.s. ll3 (1973). 
31. See BoRK, supra note 3, at 169 ("Roe became possible only because Griswold had 
created a new right, and anyone who reads Griswold can see that it was not an adjustment of 
an old principle to a new reality but the creation of a new principle by tour de force or, less 
politely, by sleight of hand"). 
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White,]., dissenting). 
33. See joHN T. NooNAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABoRTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVEN-
TIES 33-46 (1979) (arguing that federal judges have frustrated majority sentiment reflected 
in state anti-abortion laws in effect in every state); see also ELIZABETH ADELL CooK ET AL., 
BETWEEN Two ABsoLUTES: Pusuc OPINION AND THE PoLITICS OF ABoRTION 14 (1992) (con-
cluding that "there is some evidence that the Roe decision had a moderate polarizing effect 
on public opinion"); Basile]. Uddo, The Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn Through Con-
gressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Lov. L. REv. 1079, 1079-80 ( 1981) (stat-
ing that, "abortion was foisted upon the American people by an unelected, life-tenured 
judiciary, and not adopted by the deliberate workings of the more representative political 
process"). 
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anti-majoritarian judges thwarting the will of the people is powerful 
political rhetoric. 
B. The Defense: Limiting Judicial Power 
The Court's defenders emphasize the role of federal courts in 
protecting minority rights.34 Rather than challenging the assumption 
that the Court is anti-majoritarian, the Court's defenders concede the 
point and argue instead that the role of the Court is defending "dis-
crete and insular minorities"35 from the tyranny of the majority. The 
Framers of the Constitution created an independent judiciary in or-
der to prevent mob rule from overriding individual liberty.36 Most 
commentators, even the Court's sharpest critics, recognize that in 
some instances the judiciary must frustrate the public will in order to 
do substantial justice. 3 7 
Unquestionably, the Court should have the power to do justice 
that may conflict with the will of the majority. However, the percep-
tion that federal courts are routinely out of touch with majoritarian 
34. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite 
Justice Scalia's scathing dissent in which he accuses the m~ority of elitism and the imposi-
tion of their will upon all Americans, the majority failed to respond to his criticism. In 
some sense, the majority must remain silent in the face of such accusations. fL would be 
inappropriate to respond that "we are listening carefully lo the majority of Americans 
before we decide the dispute before us." To do so would suggest that the Court was decid-
ing the case based on political rather· than legal considerations. 
In Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter justi-
fied their decision to reaffirm Roe by reference to settled expectations. See Casey, 505 U.S. 
833,855-56 (1992). Butjustices Stevens and Blackmun saw no need to justify the abortion 
cases by reference to popula1· sentiment. See id. at 911-22 (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting); see id. at 922-43 (Biackmun,J., concurring and dissenting). 
Where the Court has spoken on the subject, for example in cases involving "discrete 
and insular minorities," the Court seems to take the position that, because the particular 
minority group has been deprived of political power, the legislation, not the Court, lacks 
democratic legitimacy. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 
713, 716-17 (1985). Many commentators have struggled to reconcile the C'..ourt's power to 
overturn legislation with democratic theory. See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. 
Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Ajfi1mative Action and the Dynamics of Civil 
Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 686 (1991) (discussing how Justice Scalia used Acker-
man's theory); LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§ 3-6 (2d ed. 1988). 
Many of those efforts fail to recognize that instances of the Court's anti-majoritarian hold-
ings are far fewer than generally assumed. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democ-
mcy: 171e Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. Pus. L. 279, 283 (1957). 
35. Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
36. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that the republican 
form of government avoids the evils of factions and the tyranny of the majority or 
minority). 
37. See Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 751 (1986) (recognizing that no conscientious 
judge should change his or her mind simply based on ovenvhelming public disagreement) . 
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sentiment has at times threatened a backlash against the Court.38 Ar-
guing that the Constitution empowers the judiciary to protect minor-
ity rights concedes too much to the Court's critics. 
The Court's critics overstate both the Court's immunity from 
majoritarian influences and the extent to which the Court strays from 
majority sentiment. Frequent use of such power cannot be squared 
with democracy and almost certainly undercuts the Court's legitimacy 
when it does act contrary to the m~ority. As Robert Dahl observes, 
"no amount of tampering with democratic theory can conceal the fact 
that a system in which the policy preferences of minorities prevail over 
majorities is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguishing a 
democracy from other political systems."39 Failure to rebut the Court's 
critics is an unnecessary concession that the Court is anti-majoritarian 
and worthy of popular distrust. 
Certainly, the Constitution creates the opportunity for an in-
dependent judiciary. Article III affords lifetime tenure for all federal 
judges.40 The Framers intended Article III to increase the quality of 
justice by protecting judges from political reprisals. 41 Our constitu-
tional government is a republic, not a democracy-a fact reflected in 
numerous constitutional protections.42 An independent judiciary is 
one such protection; it allows reflective decision making, free from 
the passions of the moment.43 The Framers designed an independent 
judiciary as one check on mob rule, the ugly side of democracy.44 
38. See NowAK ET AL., supra note 2, at 147-48 (discussing President Roosevelt's propo-
sal to increase the size of the Supreme Court); see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying 
text; Michael Vitiello and Andrew J. Glendon, A1ticle III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are 
Article III judges Hctpelessly Elitist?, 31 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1275, 1277 (1998) (suggesting that 
" (t]he most draconian demand is the repeal of the Lifetime tenure provisions of Article 
III") (citing H.RJ. Res. 77, l05th Cong. (1997) (providing that an Article Ill judge may not 
hold office for more than JO years without the consent of the Senate)). 
39. Dahl, supra note 34, at 283. 
40. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § l. 
41. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("(F]rom the natural feebleness 
of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its 
coordinate branches; and ... nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and indepen-
dence as permanency in office."); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERALjurusmcno:-~: TEN-
SIONS IN THE AlloCATION OF j UDICIAL POWER 50-52 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing policy 
favoring Article Ill over legislative courts). 
42. Various Constinttional protections make our system a republic and thus not fully 
democratic. For example, each state is afforded two Senators regardless of the size of the 
State's population. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3. Also, the President is not elected by majority 
vote but rather by electoral votes. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XII. 
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
44. See REmsH, supra note 41, at 8. 
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Judicial review strengthens the power of the Court to protect mi-
nority interests. Unpopular decisions are reviewable only by the 
Court's own reexamination of its doctrine or by the difficult amend-
ment process.45 But the idea that federal judges are immune from 
political reality is wrong as a matter of constitutional design and as a 
matter of common sense. Common sense tells us that judges are 
human beings who, as one commentator has said," 'follow[ ] the elec-
tion returns.' "46 
While the Court retains power over the Executive and Legislative 
branches through judicial review,47 the political branches hold sway 
over the Court beyond their respective roles in the nomination and 
confirmation process. Congress must allocate resources for the Court 
to function. 48 The Court has virtually no independent enforcement 
power and must rely on the co-operation of the executive branch of 
the government to enforce its decrees if the parties do not voluntarily 
comply.49 The fact that the President nominates a Justice and the Sen-
ate ratifies that choice allows an opportunity for the political branches 
of government to influence the direction of the Court.50 
Battles over the personal views of Court nominees, which have 
been especially visible in our recent history,51 are ample demonstra-
tion that the legislative and executive branches have a voice in di-
recting the Court. The possibility that a Justice may disappoint the 
[d. 
45. See U.S. CoNST. art. V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . ... 
46. Eric M. Uslaner & Ronald E. Weber, Public Suppon fM PrfrCiwice Abortion Policies in 
the Nation and States: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe Decisions, 77 MICH. L. REv. 
I772, 1772 (1979) (quoting R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
xiv (1970)). 
47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
48. Set U.S. CoNST. art. J, § 8. 
49. See Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 38, a t 1297. 
50. See U.S. CoNST. arL 11, § 2, d. 2 ("(The President] shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, ... and he ... shall appoint ... 
Judges of the [S]upreme (C]ourt . . . ." ). 
51. See LOUIS fiSHER ET AL., PoLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 206-10 
(1992) (stating that the Senate questioned Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and 
David Souter about their views on the right to privacy, in particular, &e v. Wade). 
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President who nominated him or her52 does not refute the fact that 
the political branches have an opportunity to influence the Court. 
And despite great debate over proper criteria for selection of a justice 
during the Bork nomination, 53 the Framers almost certainly expected 
the political branches of government to consider a nominee's views in 
making the selection.54 
While some presidents have selected youthful justices,55 most 
presidents have appointed established lawyers. 5 6 Because of that fact, 
in part, and the number of members of the Court, virtually every pres-
ident is assured at least one appointment. 5 7 The current Court is com-
posed of justices appointed by five different presidents with widely 
varied political agendas. 58 The result is that, over relatively short peri-
52. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Leak on Souter Keeps McGuigan in Play, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 10, 
1990, at 10-11 (explaining that President Eisenhower was disappointed in Justice 
Brennan). 
53. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Balance Favoring Restraint, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 15 
(1987-88) (using the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork as an example, the author 
urges that ideology should play a narrow role in the Senate's consideration of Supreme 
Court nominees); see also Phillip B. Heymann & Fred Wertheimer, Why the United States 
Senate Should Not Consent to the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be a justice of the Supreme Court, 9 
CARDozo L. REv. 21, 22 (1987-88) (noting that because Bork's "nomination represent[ed] 
a radical rejection of much of the Court's work," Common Cause took the "rare step of 
opposing a judicial nominee"). 
54. See Robert Nagel, A Comment on Democratic Constitutionalism, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1027, 
1029-30 ( 1987). 
'In a world that knows that a man's social philosophy shapes his judicial behavior, 
that philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will 
make a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator 
can do right only by treating this judgment of his, unencumbered by deference to 
the President's, as a satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote.' 
/d. (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 
79 YALE LJ. 657, 663- 64 (1970)). 
55. SeeTHE jusTICES oF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CouRT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS 1908-1910 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (showing the ages of 
former and current Supreme Court j ustices. The ages of some of the youngest appointees 
are: Douglas,]., 40 years old; Stewart,]., 43 years old; Thomas,]., 43 years old; Rehnquist, 
CJ., 47 years old); see also EDWARD LAzARus, CLOSED CHAc"'BERS 228 (1998) ("Reagan suc-
ceeded in naming a cadre of unusually young, often enormously gifted ideologues to fill 
his large reservoir of judicial vacancies") . 
56. SeeTI-u::JusncES OF THE UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT- THEIR LIVEs AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS, supra note 55, at 1908-1910 (noting that the ages of some of the older appoin-
tees are: Blackmun, J., 61 years old; Powell, J., 64 years old; Ginsburg, J., 60 years old; 
Warren, CJ., 62 years old). 
57. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 284. 
58. Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed by President Nixon as a Justice of the 
Court and by President Reagan as Chief justice; Justice Stevens, by President Ford; justices 
O 'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, by President Reagan; Justices Souter and Thomas, by Presi-
dent Bush; Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, by President Clinton. See THE JusTICES OF THE 
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ods of time, the political branches of government have an opportunity 
to reshape the Court and to bring it closer to majoritarian sentiment. 
Professor Dahl has argued that upholding minority interests over 
those of national majorities would make the Court "an extremely 
anomalous institution from a democratic point of view."59 In Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 
Dahl attempts to measure the extent to which the Court has been able 
to create policy inconsistent with the will of the national majority.6° 
He concludes that "law-making majorities generally have had their 
way."61 In a "very small number of important cases," the Court 
"delayed the application of policy up to as much as twenty-five years," 
but never "succeeded in holding out indefinitely."62 While some 
Supreme Court decisions are contrat}' to the will of the majority, if 
Dahl's findings are correct, the Court's critics are wrong when they 
characterize the institution as counter-majoritarian. 
C. Preference for Legislative Action: Overstating Legislation as an 
Expression of the Will of the Majority 
Critics of the Court assume that state legislation better reflects 
majority sentiment than a decision of an Article III court striking 
down that legislation. For example, Judge Bork has stated that, 
"[I] egislation is far more likely to reflect majority sentiment while judi-
cial activism is likely to represent an elite minority's sentiment."63 
The preference for legislative action ignores a number of ways in 
which legislation may not reflect majoritarian will. Few legislators are 
selected for their views on a single issue.64 Low voter turnout means 
that, even if voters select a candidate based on his or her views on a 
particular issue, that representative's vote on a particular bill may not 
UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT-THEIR LrvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, supra note 55, at 
1910-11. 
59. Dahl, supra note 34, at 291. 
60. See id. at 282. 
61. Id. at 291. 
62. Id. 
63. BoRK, supra note 3, at 17; see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi~ 57 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) (stating that a "democratic society does not ... need constitutional 
guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect 'current values.' Elections take care of that 
quite well") ; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court 
has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from 
which members of this institution are selected .. . ). 
64. CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADU.Y c. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES 231 (1989) 
("[C)ontrol of Congress and the presidency is based upon coalitions of alliances of ... 
[the) interests" of "the law-making majority"). 
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reflect the prevailing sentiment.65 Few question that money may skew 
election results, again making less certain a relationship between pop-
ular will and the views of elected officials. 66 Another reality is that 
many representatives respond to vocal minorities,67 organized groups 
which flood a representative's office with correspondence favorable to 
their positions.68 Gerrymandered voting districts may sap the political 
strength of the majority,69 as may a gubernatoriaJ70 or presidential 
veto.71 
Thus, the critics' dichotomy between legislation and Court rul-
ings is simplistic. They overstate the Court's ability and willingness to 
depart from majoritarian sentiment and ignore ways in which legisla-
tors frustrate the will of the populace. 
Many of these modern critics see Roe as prime evidence that the 
Court is anti-majoritarian.72 After aJl, in 1973, despite some liberaJiza-
tion of state abortion law, no state had a law on the books as permis-
sive as Roe. 73 Since that time, the Court has frequently struck down 
state laws regulating abortion. 74 After a review of twenty-five years 
worth of abortion cases, this article attempts to measure majoritarian 
views on abortion to see whether the Court has in fact deviated from 
popular will.75 For the reasons discussed in this section, the author's 
65. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 283-84. 
66. See Dan Baltz, Clin«m Defends Satellite Waiver, WASH. PoST, May 18, 1998, at Al 
(reporting that Bill Clinton denied foreign policy decisions affecting China were influ-
enced by political conu;butions); see also Not from Companies, NEws & OBSERVER, May 22, 
1998, at A20 (stating that "a torrential flow of money in politics makes public service an 
endless chase for funds, keeps many qualified people from taking part, and skews legisla-
tion in favor of economic interests"). 
67. See CooK ET AL., supra note 33, at 199-200. 
68. See id. 
69. See William Booth & William Claiborne, Lt. Governor Wzns Prima1y in Califurnia; 
Rich Dmwcrats Lag in Bids for Governor, WASH. PoST, June 3, 1998, at Al (commenting that 
the California race is especially important because the governor will control reapportion-
ment of congressional districts after the 2000 consensus); see also Ralph Z. Hallow, GOP's 
Nervous in Califurnia Success in Gubernatorial Primary May Backfire in November, WASH. TIMES, 
June 2, 1998, at A6 (noting that the election is "about three things: reapportionment, 
reapportionment, reapportionment"); Dave Lesher, California and the West, Stakes Grow 
Higher in Race for Govemor Politics, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 15, 1998, at A3 (noting that if 
democrats continue to hold their majority in the California legislature, Republicans fear 
lawmakers could join forces with a democratic governor and adopt a new map of political 
districts that weakens GOP chances substantially). 
70. See TEx. CoNST. art. IV, § 14; LA. CoNST. art. III, § 18. 
71. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7. 
72. See BoRK, supra note 3; see also NooNAN, sujJra note 33. 
73. See NooNAN, mjJm note 33, at 33-34. 
74. See CooK ET AL., supra note 33, at 2. 
75. See discussion infra Parts II and IV. 
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hypothesis prior to collecting data was that the abortion cases would, 
in fact, closely represent the will of the majority. The research substan-
tiates this position. 
II. The Abortion Doctrine 
This section reviews Supreme Court abortion case law over the 
past twenty-five years. 76 Polling organizations have canvassed the pub-
lic on several issues, most notably: the general right to an abortion,77 
informed consent,78 parentaF9 and spousal80 notification, and public 
funding.81 This section discusses the Court's holdings in these areas. 
A. The Right to an Abortion 
For the first time in 1973, the Supreme Court held that a wo-
man's constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses the 
right to terminate a pregnancy.82 The Court held that the federal 
courts should apply strict scrutiny to legislation outlawing abortion.83 
Although the source of that right has generated controversy, 84 Roe and 
its defenders ground it in the Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
76. Polling data does not address methods of abortion. Therefore, these issues are not 
included in this inquiry. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 75-79 (1976) (addressing the state legislature's regulation of abortion methods) ; see 
also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health [hereinafter Akron 1], 462 U.S. 
416, 436-38 (1983) (discussing the state legislature's regulation of abortion procedures). 
77. See THE GALLUP PoLL MoNTHLY, July, 1992, at 52. 
78. See THE GALLUP PoLL MoNTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 34. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 35. 
81. See Larry Hugick, Abortion: Majority Critical of Abortion Decision, but Most Americans 
Favor Some New Restrictions, THE GALLUP REPoRT, July 1989, at 10. 
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). 
83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56. 
84. See BoRK, supra note 3, at 169-70 (stating that the Court found a right to abortion 
in the constitution without explaining even once how that right could be derived from any 
constitutional materials); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting) (quot-
ing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ): 
[T]he asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' .. . 
To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to 
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
ld.; see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U .S. 833, 983 (1992) (Justice 
Scalia, dissenting) (stating that "the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the 
word ' liberty' must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a 
collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political 
choice"). 
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interest.85 Even from its first articulation in Roe, a woman's right to 
terminate her pregnancy has never been absolute.86 The Court ac-
knowledged a legitimate state interest in preserving and protecting 
maternal health and the potential life of the unborn child. 87 Roe cre-
ated a trimester framework to explain the balance between these vari-
ous interests.88 
During the first trimester, the decision to terminate a pregnancy 
rests solely with the woman and her physician.89 Maternal health sim-
ply cannot justify the state's interference with the woman's right to an 
abortion in light of data suggesting that mortality in abortion may be 
less than mortality in normal childbirth.90 At the end of the first tri-
mester, according to the Court, a state may regulate abortion as long 
as the regulation "reasonably relates to the preservation and protec-
tion of maternal health."91 During the final trimester, at the point 
when a fetus becomes viable, a state may impose significant regula-
tions based on its compelling interest in protecting a potential life.92 
The Court recognized a state's right to proscribe abortion during the 
third trimester except when necessary to protect the life or health of 
the mother. 93 
&e has been the subject of some of the most scathing criticism of 
any Supreme Court decision.94 Efforts to overturn Roe have galvanized 
a large segment of the population and have changed many historical 
voting patterns. Many Catholic voters-largely Democratic voters in 
this century-have joined historically apolitical, fundamentalist Chris-
tians in an effort to overturn Roe.95 This new voting block found a 
85. See Crwry, 505 U.S. at 846-50 (O'Connor,J.,joint opinion); TRIBE, supra note 34, 
§ 15-10, at 1341. 
86. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting that "[t]he privacy right involved, therefore, can-
not be said to be absolute." At some point in pregnancy, the state's interests in safeguard-
ing health, in maintaining medical standards, and .in protecting potential life, "become 
sufficiently compelling w sustain regulation of the facwrs that govern the abortion 
decision"). 
87. See i4. at 162-63. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id, at 163-64. 
94. See Bork, supra note 3, at l 69; see also NOONAN, supra note 33, at 46; CooK ET AL., 
supra note 33, at 2. 
95. See CooK ET AL., supra note 33, at 101 (noting that, in regard to their attitudes on 
legalized abortion, "Catholics and evangelicals were nearly identical by the end of the 
decade"). 
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home in the Republican party, despite pro-choice majorities within 
the Republican party.96 
Ronald Reagan, owing his election in large part to the Christian 
right,97 made a judicial candidate's position on abortion a litmus 
test.98 George Bush, although perhaps not as single minded as his 
predecessor, demonstrated a similar commitment to the anti-abortion 
electorate.99 Senate judiciary hearings on Supreme Court nominees 
became national debates on the abortion question with the nominees' 
positions on &e the topic of many questions, 100 usually finessed by the 
nominee.101 Together with Roe dissenter Justice Rehnquist, Reagan's 
and Bush's five appointees102 gave the Court enough votes to overrule 
&e.1o3 
96. See Bob Dole's Independence Day, EcoNOMIST, July 6, 1996, at 19 (noting that "[i] n 
states up and down the country, from Minnesota to South Carolina, opponents of abortion 
have seized control of local Republican parties." Currently, the Republican platform op-
poses all abortion and calls for a constitutional amendment to outlaw it); see also Intensity 
Gives Anti-Abortionists a Political Edge, CNN television broadcast, May 9, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File (finding that Polls show most Republicans acmally 
support abortion rights, but abortion opponents have an enormous amount of power be-
cause of their intensity and commitment. The abortion issue is more likely to drive their 
vote. The l 2% of voters who said abortion was the number one issue when voting drive the 
vote. They don't just hold an opinion, they vote their opinions); Republican Diversity over 
Abortion Rights is Complex, National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 20, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File (stating that a recent Wall Street journal poll con· 
firms that despite there being a substantial majority of Republicans who favor legal abor-
tion, fierce anti-abortion language has been written into the past four Republican 
presidential platforms because the pro-life minority continues to control). 
97. See Christian Right About to Tum Tables on RejJublicans, Hous. CI!RON., June 12, 
1998, at A: Outlook (stating that Christian political activists helped sweep Ronald Reagan 
and George Bush to the White House in the 1980s); see also Reagan Redux, MoTHER joNES, 
Nov./Dec., 1998, at 27 (•·eporting that Ronald Reagan was the candidate of the Christian 
Right). 
98. See LAZARus, supra note 55, at 376-79. 
99. See L~ZARus, supra note 55, at 373. 
100. See id. at 441 (referring to Souter,].); see also FisHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 206-10 
(noting that senators questioned Bork and Souter about their views on privacy). 
101. See LAZARus, supra note 55, at 255 (noting that at the Senate hearings, "Kennedy 
followed a script that would become standard for future nominees: he endorsed the idea 
that the Constitution included some sort of right to privacy but retreated to meaningless 
platimdes when pressed to define how extensive that right would be"); see also id. at 453 
(noting that during his Senate hearings, "Thomas took the now standard avoidance of the 
Roe question to new heights of disingenuousness"). 
102. Reagan appointed the followingjustices:J. O'Connor, 1981;]. Scalia, 1986;J. Ken· 
nedy, 1988; President Bush appointed the following Justices: J. Thomas, 1991; J. Souter, 
1990. See THE JusTICES OF TI-lE UNITED STATES SuPREME CoURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS, supra note 55, at 1910-ll. 
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-78 (1973) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
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The Court has twice failed, however, to gamer a majority to over-
rule !We. Sixteen years after !We and after three Reagan appointments 
to the Court,104 the Supreme Court faced a direct challenge to !We in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 105 The Missouri legislation at is-
sue in Webster included a preamble setting forth the legislature's find-
ings "that ' [ t] he life of each human being begins at conception,' and 
that 'unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and 
well-being."' 106 The legislation's drafters aimed both findings at un-
dercutting Roe's central tenets. 107 The statute also included a provision 
forcing doctors to determine the state of fetal development, 108 a provi-
sion anti-abortion proponents drafted to undercut Roe's trimester 
scheme.109 
A divided Court declined to overrule Roe, 110 but the opinion left 
Rne's future uncertain. Four dissenting justices made clear their con-
tinuing support for Rne.m Justice O'Connor, who gave the Chief Jus-
tice a fifth vote to uphold the statute, refused to reach the core 
question of the continuing constitutional vitality of !We v. Wade. 11 2 
Two changes in Court personnel113 and a plausible reading of Justice 
O'Connor's pivotal opinions in recent abortion cases114 left Roe espe-
104. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy were appointed during this time period. 
See THE JusTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPIN-
IONS, supra note 55, at 1910-11. 
105. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
106. Webster, 492 U.S. at501 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT.§ 1.205(1)(2) (1986)) (alteration 
in original). 
107. See LAZARus, supra note 55, at 377. 
108. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 501 (citing Mo. REv. STAT.§ 188.029 (1986)) (noting that 
the physician is required to ascertain whether "the fetus is viable by performing 'such med-
ical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, 
weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child'"). 
109. See LAZARus, supra note 55, at 377 (suggesting that "in an effort to break down 
EWe's trimester framework, the state commanded that when a doctor had reason to believe 
a fetus was twenty weeks into gestation (well before the third trimester) , that doctor must 
perform tests to determine whether the fetus was viable"). 
110. See Webst111; 492 U.S. at 521. 
Ill. The four dissenting Justices who maintained clear support for Roe were Marshall, 
Brennan, Blackrnun, and Stevens. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Blackrnun, J., concurring 
and dissenting); see id. at 560 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
112. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 525. "When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abor-
tion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time 
enough to reexamine Roe." /d. at 526. 
113. Justices Souter and Thomas were appointed by President Bush. See WILLIAM Co-
HEN & joNATHAN D. VA.RAT, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: CAsEs AND MATERIALS 1718 (lOth ed. 
1997). 
114. See Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1982) (O'Connor,]. , dissenting); Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-33 (1986) 
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dally vulnerable. So vulnerable was /We that a three judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Roe's strict scrutiny 
standard was no longer good law. 11 5 
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v . Casey116 regulated abortion through a variety of 
means, including informed consent provisions,117 a twenty-four hour 
waiting period requirement, 118 and parental notification for mi-
nors.U9 The Third Circuit's analysis would have been different had it 
employed the prevailing strict scrutiny analysis, rather than the undue 
burden test the panel now thought the Court favored. 120 Thus, the 
Pennsylvania legislation did not directly call Rne's core protection into 
question. Counsel for Planned Parenthood decided to do so when she 
asked the Supreme Court to grant writ of certiorari to review a single 
question: "Has the Supreme Court overruled /We v. Wade, holding that 
a woman's right to choose abortion is a fundamental right protected 
by the United States Constitution?"1 21 
Casey produced no majority opinion. Apparently, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist assigned himself the majority opinion with the belief that 
he now had sufficient votes, if not to overrule, at least to eviscerate 
Roe's protection of abortion rights. 122 During post-argument machina-
tions, he lost Justice Kennedy's vote and ended up writing a concur-
ring opinion in which he urged the Court to employ only a rational 
basis test to determine the constitutionality of state laws regulating 
abortion. 123 A rational basis test would have allowed considerable reg-
ulation of abortion, effectively overruling !We. Even by recent stan-
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-901 
(1992). 
115. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687-97 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(stating that, since the strict scrutiny test of &e no longer commanded a court majority, it 
should no longer be applied). 
116. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
117. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (discussing 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3205 (1990)). 
118. See id. at 885. 
119. See id. at 899-900. 
120. See LAzARus, supra note 55, at 459. "(T]he Third Circuit announced that, because 
EWe's central premise-its high-wattage 'strict' judicial scrutiny test for abortion regula-
tions-no longer commanded a Court majority, it should no longer be applied." Id. It 
substituted O 'Connor's undue burden test for strict scrutiny and "tried to guess how she 
would evaluate it." !d. If they had evaluated the statute under strict scrutiny, "all would have 
failed." !d. at 460. 
121. /d. at 461-62. 
122. See id. at 468. 
123. See id. at 472, 482. 
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dards, 124 Casey divided-no, splintered-the CourL Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, and Souter delivered a joint opinion, 125 most sections of 
which gained differing majorities. Justices Blackmun126 and Stevens127 
concurred in part and dissented in part. They disagreed with the joint 
opinion's imposition of a new standard by which state legislation 
would be judged.128 Most importantly, they disagreed with the aban-
donment of Roe's trimester analysis. 129 
The joint opinion came as a surprise to most Court watchers be-
cause the threejustice block prevented the expected overruling of 
Roe.130 The analysis of the joint opinion did, however, give states 
greater freedom to regulate abortion. 
The opinion reexamined Roe and, while not explicitly stating that 
it was doing so, it substituted a more flexible undue burden test for 
the strict scrutiny test applied in earlier cases. 131 It fastened onto Roe's 
articulation of the state's "important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life,"132 an aspect of Roe ignored in 
subsequent decisions which subjected all regulations to strict scru-
tiny.133 At least some of those cases could not "be reconciled with the 
holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in the health 
of the woman and in protecting potential life within her." 134 
The joint opinion summarized a number of the important points 
governing abortion regulations. First, a court must examine abortion 
regulation to determine whether it imposes an "undue burden" on a 
124. See Kenneth R. Wing, Th<~ Principles & Principals of Almtio-n Compromise, 18 J. 
HEALTH PoL. PoL'Y. & L. 967, 968 (1993) (noting that "[b]y the late 1980s, the disputes 
among the justices in abortion cases had become markedly divisive and antagonistic"); 
Michael J. Gerhardt, TM Pressure of Precedmt: A Critique of IM Conseroative ApproacM5 to Stare 
Decisis in Almtion Cases, 10 CaNST. CoMMENT. 67, 69 (1993) (noting that Cosey revealed 
deep seated dh1sions within the Rehnquist court regarding "whether the Constitution pro-
tects the right to have an abortion and about the role of precedent in constitutional 
decisionmaking"). 
125. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 833 (1992). 
126. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 922. 
127. See id. at 911. 
128. See id. at 920-23 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
129. See id. at 914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 929-35 
(Biackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (urging that, "Roes requirement of strict scru-
tiny as implemented through a trimester framework should not be disturbed"). 
130. See Gerhardt, supra note 124, at 69 (noting that Court watchers expected the over-
ruling of Roe with Casey but the unexpected happened-a bare majority, including justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, expressly reaffirmed Roe). 
131. See Cast)•, 505 U.S. at 956 (Rehnquist, CJ., concuning and disse nting). 
132. Id. at 871 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). 
133. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. 
134. Id. 
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woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability.l35 Sec-
ond, Roe's trimester analysis no longer governs abortion cases. The 
joint opinion specified that, in order to advance its profound interest 
in potential life, the state may adopt measures to assure that the wo-
man's choice is fully informed and may attempt to persuade the wo-
man to choose childbirth over abortion.136 Third, health and safety 
measures are proper unless they have the purpose or effect of present-
ing a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.137 Fourth, 
the justices reaffirmed Roe's central holding that a woman has a right 
to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetal viability.138 Lastly, with re-
gard to post-viability, the state may regulate or proscribe abortion, ex-
cept where necessary for preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.I39 
As observed by Justice Blackmun, if the various regulations had 
been subject to strict scrutiny, the Court would have found all of the 
regulations unconstitutional. 140 Hence, to some extent, Casey signaled 
a compromise between a rigid application of Roe's standards and ef-
forts to overrule it. Even with regard to Roe's core protection, the joint 
opinion underscored that, although abortion remains a woman's 
choice, it is subject to some significant lobbying by the state. 141 
B. Informed Consent 
Three years after Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth,142 the Supreme Court upheld Missouri's informed consent 
provision.143 At a minimum, Danforth demonstrated the Court would 
allow some limited regulation of abortion. Danforth found the in-
formed consent provision not only "desirable," but "imperative."144 
Missouri's informed consent law was similar to the informed consent 
135. See id. at 886. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 874 (holding that, "[o]nly where State regulation imposes an undue bur-
den on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the 
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause") . 
138. See id. at 846. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that under the 
strict scrutiny standard, "the Pennsylvania statute's provisions requiring content-based 
counseling, a 24-hour delay, informed parental consent, and reporting of abortion-related 
information must be invalidated"). 
141. See id. at 846. 
142. 428 U.S. 52 (1975). 
143. See Danfarth, 428 U.S. at 67. 
144. !d. 
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required by other medical procedures in that the physician deter-
mined consent on a case-by- case basis. 145 As indicated by the Court, a 
state may constitutionally mandate such informed consent for any 
other medical procedures as well as for abortion. 146 
By 1982, abortion foes, testing Danjcmh 's outer limits, urged a 
number of states and municipalities to pass informed consent stat-
utes. 147 For example, Ohio's new informed consent statute, at issue in 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 148 specified the in-
formation that a physician must give a patient in order to qualify her 
consent as "informed."149 The statute required that the attending phy-
sician inform the patient that "the unborn child is a human life from 
the moment of conception."150 The statute further compelled the 
physician to describe to the patient "in detail the anatomical and phys-
iological characteristics of the particular unborn child" and to tell her 
that "abortion is a major surgical procedure. "151 The statute also in-
cluded a mandatory 24-hour waiting period between the execution of 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See generally Akron I, 462 U.S. 416,419 (1982) (noting that "[l]egislative responses 
to the Court's decision have required us on several occasions, and again today, to define 
the limits of a state 's authority to regulate the performance of abortions. And arguments 
continue to be made in these cases as well, that we erred in interpreting the Constitution"). 
148. 462 U.S. 416 ( 1982). 
149. See Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 423 (citing Cnv OF AKRoN, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 
1870, § 1870.06 (1978)). 
In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent, an 
abortion shall be performed OJ" induced u pon a pregnant woman only after she, 
and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accord-
ance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have been orally informed by her 
attending physician of the following facts, and have signed a consent form ac-
knowledging that she, and the parent or legal guardian where applicable, have 
been informed as follows .... 
l d. at 423 n.5 (quoting CITY OF AKRoN, OHIO, CODIF1ED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B) 
(1978)). 
150. /d. at 423 n.5 (quoting Cnv OF AKRON, OHIO, CoDIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, 
§ 1870.06(B) (3) (1978)) . 
/d. 
[T] here has been described in detail the anatOmical and physiological character-
istics of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at 
which time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appear-
ance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain 
and heart function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external 
members. 
151. Jd. (quoting Crrv or AKRoN, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B) 
(1978) ). 
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the patient's informed consent and the performance of the 
procedure. 152 
The Court held these provisions violated the constitutional right 
to abortion.153 According to the Court, the informed consent provi-
sions were unconstitutional in Danforth in part because they directed 
the individual physician to decide what information would be relevant 
to a particular patient.154 The Ohio statute went beyond the state's 
legitimate interest to inform a patient; instead, the state was impermis-
sibly attempting to persuade the patient to forego abortion.155 
In 1986, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state's efforts 
to use informed consent provisions "to intimidate women into contin-
uing pregnancies."156 Similar to the provision struck down in Akron I, 
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act at issue in Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists157 specified information that 
had to be made available to a woman contemplating an abortion.158 
For example, the state-supplied printed material included anatomical 
and physiological characteristics of the fetus and a list of agencies of-
152. See id. at 424 n.6 (citing CnY OF AKRoN, OHIO, CoomEo ORDINANCES ch. 1870, 
§ 1870.07 (1978)). 
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until 
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one 
of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with 
Section 1870.05(8) of this Chapter, have signed the consent form required by 
Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing that such 
time has elapsed. 
!d. 
!d. 
153. See id. at 445. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. at 443-44. 
The validity of an informed consent requirement thus rests on the State's interest 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman .. .. It remains primarily the 
responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed 
to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances .... 
Viewing the city's regulations in this light, we believe that §1870.06(8) at-
tempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring "informed consent" beyond per-
missible limits. First, it is fair to say that much of the infonnation required is 
designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to with-
hold it altogether. 
156. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 759 (1986). 
157. 476 u.s. 747 (1986). 
158. See id. at 759-60 (noting that 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a) (1982) required 
"that the woman give her 'voluntary and informed consent' to an abortion. Failure to ob-
serve the provisions of§ 3205 su~ject[ed] the physician to suspension or revocation of his 
license, and subject[ed] any other person obligated to provide information relating to in-
formed consent to criminal penalties" under§ 3205(c)). 
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fering alternatives to abortion. 159 Other required information in-
cluded "the 'fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for 
prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care,'" and "the 'fact that the 
father is liable to assist' in the child's support."160 
According to the Court, Pennsylvania's law ran afoul of its hold-
ing in Akron I because the law was "designed 'to influence the wo-
man's informed choice between abortion or childbirth."' 16 1 The 
printed material was an "outright attempt to wedge the Common-
wealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the in-
formed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician."162 
The requirement that the physician provide non-medical information, 
like available alternatives, was irrelevant to the medical decision that a 
doctor and a patient must make.163 Further, that kind of information 
did not advance the state's legitimate interest in protecting the wo-
man's health.l 64 
Although the Court in Casey again declined to overrule Roe's 
"core" holding, it did overrule those portions of Akron I and Thorn-
burgh which dealt with informed consent provisions and twenty-four 
hour waiting periods.165 The joint opinion of Kennedy, Souter, and 
O'Connor provided three votes to overrule these provisions in addi-
tion to those justices who would have overruled (or all but overruled) 
Roe.tss 
The joint opinion in Casey found that Akron I and Thornburgh 
went too far in holding that the mandatory dissemination of truthful 
and not misleading information was unconstitutional. 167 Three jus-
tices held that the state does have an interest in protecting potential 
life and in the health and mental well-being of the woman.l68 Requir-
ing the woman to be fully informed furthers legitimates these inter-
ests, "even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for 
childbirth over abortion." 169 The Court found that Pennsylvania's in-
159. Set id. at 761. 
160. !d. at 760-61 (quoting 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1982)) . 
161. ld. at 760 (quoting Akron[, 463 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)) . 
162. Jd. at 762. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. at 763. 
165. See Planned Parenthood of S.F.. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 887 (1992). 
166. See id. (O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy, JJ., joint opinion); see id. at 968-69 
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in his concurring opin-
ion by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 944. 
167. See id. at 882. 
168. See id. at 871. 
169. ld. at 883. 
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formed consent requirement was "a reasonable measure to ensure an 
informed choice," and, as such, was not "a substantial obstacle to ob-
taining an abortion."17° Casey departed from earlier case law that, in 
effect, required the state to remain neutral in its view of abortion. 171 
Now, the state may make a value judgment expressing a preference 
for childbirth. 
The joint opinion also concluded that the twenty-four hour wait-
ing period was constitutional. It was "a reasonable measure to imple-
ment the State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn."172 
Increased costs and potential delays, although "troubling in some re-
spects,"173 did "not demonstrate that the waiting period constitut[ed] 
an undue burden."174 The statutory exception for medical emergen-
cies alleviated the potential health risks posed by the waiting pe-
riod.175 Like the informed consent provision, the waiting period 
demonstrated the state's preference for childbirth and limited the 
physician's and patient's discretion. Under the now prevailing undue 
burden test, the state may do so. I 76 
Nowhere is the shift in the Court's abortion case law more obvi-
ous than in the informed consent and waiting period discussion. 
Within limits, the state may, in effect, lobby the woman to elect child-
birth over abortion.l 77 The state may limit discretion by imposing 
some conditions that would not have withstood earlier strict scru-
tiny. 178 Further, the state may advance the interest offetallife, not just 
maternal health, even during the earliest stages of fetal 
development.179 
C. Spousal Consent and Notification 
The Supreme Court has ruled on two aspects of the father's 
rights in an abortion decision. In early cases, the Court examined stat-
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. The challenge to the physician 's First Amendment right not 
to provide information to his or her patient was quickly dismissed in the joint opinion. See 
id. at 884. The Court recognized that d1e practice of medicine is always subject to reason-
able licensing and regulation by the State. See id. 
171. See id. at 871-77; but see Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444 (stating that information dissemi-
nated for purposes of informed consent must be only to inform and not to persuade). 
172. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885. 
173. !d. at 886. 
174. !d. 
175. See id. at 885. 
176. See id. at 886. 
177. See id. at 872. 
178. See id. at 883. 
179. See id. at 968 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). 
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utes that required spousal consent.180 Most recently, state attempts to 
compel spousal notification have been cha1Jenged. 18 1 The Court has 
rejected both efforts as a violation of Roe's core protection. 
In Roe, Texas law made virtually all abortions illegal. 182 Recogniz-
ing the potential argument in favor of a spouse's right to participate 
in the decision to terminate a pregnancy, the Court explicitly reserved 
judgment on the constitutionality of a spousal consent provision. 183 
Three years la ter, in Danfmh, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Missouri provision requiring that a woman se-
cure her husband's written consent during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy, unless tl1e woman's life was in danger.1s4 The Court held 
the spousal consent requirement was unconstitutional. 185 
Although the Court recognized the "deep and proper concern" 
of a husband and prospective father, 186 the Court rejected Missouri's 
spousal consent requirement for two reasons. 187 First, the effect of the 
statute was to delegate the decision to the husband. Allowing a hus-
band to regulate a wife's choice would be inconsistent with Roe's de ter-
mination that a woman has an unfettered choice to te rminate a 
pregnancy during the first trimester.• ss Second, the husband's right 
could not outweigh the pregnant woman's right. As the woman is 
"more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy . . . the 
balance weighs in h er favor."189 The Court also fotmd unpersuasive 
the state's claim that the statute was intended to foster mutuality and 
trust in the marriage. 190 
In response to Danforth, the Pennsylvania legislature added a re-
quirement of spousal notification. 1~ 1 That provision was apparently 
designed to circumvent the concern articulated in Danfmh that a wo-
ISO. Su Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). 
181. See C.asey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992). 
182. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973). 
183. See icL at 165 n.67. 
184. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 85 (appendix to the opinion) (quoting H.C.S. HousE Bru. 
No. 1211 § 3: "No ab<lnion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy except: ... (3) [w]ith the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the 
abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of 
the mother"). 
185. Se£ id., 428 U.S. at 71. 
186. Id. at 69. 
187. See id. at 71. 
188. See id. at 69. 
189. Id. at 71 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)). 
190. See id., 428 U.S. at 71. 
191. See Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,908 (1983) (appendix 
to the opinion ) (quoting 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1990)). The statute provided: 
72 UNIVERSI1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
man's husband not be able to create an absolute obstacle to her deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy. 192 In Casey, Planned Parenthood 
challenged the spousal notification provision.193 Justices Blackmun 
and Stevens joined the opinion authored by Justices Souter, Kennedy, 
and O'Connor194 to create a majority striking down the spousal notifi-
cation provision.J9s 
The Court declared the spousal notification provision an undue 
burden on the woman's right to choose.196 The Court dismissed the 
commonwealth's argument that the provision did not create an un-
due burden because "the statute affect[ed] fewer than one percent of 
women seeking abortions."197 The Court believed that spouses in well-
functioning marriages would discuss whether the wife ought to termi-
nate her pregnancy.198 Women who would not inform their spouses 
would most likely fail to do so because the pregnancy was "the result 
of an extramarital affair," or because "the husband and wife [were] 
experiencing marital difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of 
violence."199 Thus, Pennsylvania's law could have put a woman at risk 
of physical or emotional harm or both. 2oo 
I d. 
Spousal Notice. (a) Spousal notice required.-In order to further the Common-
wealth's interest in promoting the integlity of the marital relationship and to pro-
tecta spouse's interests in having children within marliage and in protecting the 
prenatal life of that spouse's child, no physician shall perfonn an abortion on a 
married woman, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she 
has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman 
upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that 
she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any 
false statement made therein is punishable by law. 
192. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71. 
193. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
194. See id. at 922 (Blackmun,J., concurring and dissenting); see id. at 911-14 (Stevens, 
J. , concurring and dissenting). 
195. See id. 
196. See id. a t 892-93 (citing the lower court's findings that the notification provision 
would adversely affect abused women). 
197. !d. at 894. 
198. See id. at 892-93. 
199. ld. at 892. 
200. See id. at 893-94. The Court went on to discuss the delicate balance between a 
woman's right to choose and her husband's right to know of that choice. It is an "ines-
capable biological fact that the state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carry-
ing will have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the father's." ld. at 896. 
After the child is born, the father of that ·hild does have a legally recognized interest in 
that child 's custody and growth; until then, the woman's rights must prevail. See id. at 
895-96. The Court clearly rejected the common law view of women as chattel of their 
husband. See id. at 898. No longer is a woman required to advise her husband and obtain 
his permission before exercising her own personal choices. See id. The Court expressed a 
Fall1999) THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE WILL OF THE MAJORilY 73 
D. Parental Consent and Notification 
The abortion issue most frequently addressed by the Supreme 
Court involves the rights of minors and their parents.201 While states 
have attempted a variety of restrictions, the Supreme Court has con-
tinued to follow the basic structure first articulated by the Court in 
1976 in Bellotti v. Baird,202 upholding parental consent and notifica-
tion provisions as long as the state provides for alternative procedures 
in some cases. 203 
In Danforth, although the Court recognized that minors do not 
always receive the same constitutional protections as adults204 and that 
states have broad authority to regulate conduct of minors,205 the 
Supreme Court found a "blanket" parental consent requirement un-
constitutional.206 Under Missouri law, any unmarried minor had to 
secure the consent of one parent before she could terminate her 
pregnancy.207 The Court rejected the state's asserted interest in safe-
fear of the infamous "slippery slope" in that first we require notice of abortion, then notice 
of birth control use, then women would be required to get pennission to drink alcohol, 
and so on. Sn id. 
201. The Court has considered a total of 10 cases regarding parental notification or 
consent: Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 
(1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 
398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 {1979) [hereinafter Belwtti Ill; Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 
132 (1976) [hereinafter Bellotti 1). In stark contrast, the Court has only considered 1.wo 
cases regarding spousal rights: Danfmth and Casey, and, only two cases regarding regulation 
of abortion methods: Danforth and Akron I. Twenty-four hour waiting periods have only 
been reviewed by the Coun on two occasions: Akron 1 and Casey. The issue of informed 
consenl has only been before the Court four times: Danfmth, Akron I, Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and Casey. Finally, 
statutes which prohibit public funding for abortions have only been reviewed by l.he Court 
four times: Webster v. Reproductive Heall.h Servs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977). 
202. BelU>tti I, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
203. &e Belwtti I, 428 u.s. at 147. 
204. See Danfmth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
205. See icL at 74-75. 
206. See id. at 74. 
207. See id. at 85 {appendix to opinion) (quoting H.C.S. HousE Btu No. 1211, § 3(4)). 
The statute provided: 
I d. 
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of preg-
nancy excepl. .. (4) [w]ith the written consenl. of one parent .. . if the woman is 
unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by 
a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve l.he life of the mother. 
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guarding the family unit and parental authority. 2os The "veto power" 
created by the requirement was unlikely to advance the state's asserted 
interests.209 The Court did imply that a state might tailor its law more 
closely to its legitimate interests.21o 
In Bellotti L the Supreme Court distinguished Massachusetts's pa-
rental consent law from the consent law involved in Danforth.211 Massa-
chusetts provided for a judicial bypass "for 'good cause shown,"'21 2 
whereby a minor, unable to secure the consent of one of her parents, 
could petition the court for the right to terminate her pregnancy.213 
However, no clear parental consent doctrine emerged because the 
Court did not determine whether the statute was nonetheless uncon-
stitutional as an undue burden on a minor's right to obtain an abor-
tion.214 Conflicting interpretations of the statute made it uncertain 
whether the statute would be upheld.21 5 Thus, according to the Court, 
the district court should have abstained from ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the statute pending a definitive ruling by the Massachu-
setts courts.216 
Three years later, the Court reviewed the same controversy.217 In 
Bellotti v. Baird,218 the Court concluded that a blanket provision re-
208. See id. at 75. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See Bellotti/, 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976). 
212. ld. at 134-35 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch.112, § 12P (West 1974)). 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 146. 
215. See id. at 148. The first interpretation protected minors from arbil.l'ar)' refusal of a 
parent's consenL On the one hand, the interests of the minor were protected because a 
parent should only consider the minor's best interest when deciding whether to consent. 
See id. at 144. On the other hand, if a minor could demonstrate sufficient maturity she 
could obtain a judicial bypass without parental counseling. See id. Finally, under the first 
interpretation, a minor's interests were protected because even a minor determined to be 
legally immature could obtain judicial consent if the judge believed the abortion would be 
in the minor's best interests. See id. at 145. The second interpretation suggested that the 
parents were empowered with influence comparable to a veto because of the burdensome 
nature of the judicial bypass. See id. at 146. 
216. See id. at 146. 
217. See Bellotti//, 443 U.S. 622,625 (1979) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.l12, § 12S 
(West Supp. 1979)). The statute provides: 
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent 
of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be penormed on the 
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, 
consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause 
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary .. . . 
/d. (alteration in original). 
218. Bellotti//, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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quiring all minors to obtain parental consent was unconstitutional.219 
Justice Powell's plurality opinion concluded that for a parental con-
sent statute to sunrive, the state must provide an alternative procedure 
whereby the minor can obtain the necessary authorization.22o The by-
pass must allow the minor to show either that she is sufficiently ma-
ture to make the decision independently of her parents or that the 
abortion would be in her best interest.221 The state must also guaran-
tee an expeditious decision and the minor's anonymity.222 While some 
aspects of the Massachusetts statute complied with the plurality's crite-
ria, the Court found that two sections of the law violated Roe. 223 First, 
the law did not allow the minor to petition the court without first 
giving notice to her parents. 224 Second, the law also allowed a judicial 
veto of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion.225 
Two years later, in H.L. v. Matheson,226 the Court upheld a Utah 
parental notification provision.227 Since the plaintiff did not allege 
that she was an emancipated or mature minor, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to a minor who was "liv-
ing with and dependent upon her parents," who was "not emanci-
pated by marriage,"221:! and who had made "no claim or showing as to 
her maturity or as to her relations with her parents."229 The Court 
held that although a state may not constitutionally impose a "blanket, 
unreviewable power of parents to veto their daughter's abortion" deci-
sion,230 a "'mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate the 
constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor. "231 Since the 
Utah law did not create a parental veto over the minor's decision and 
did provide for a judicial alternative, the Court upheld the law. 232 
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion,233 underscored that the 
Court left open whether a statute violates a minor's constitutional 
219. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 u.s. 52, 74 (1976)). 
220. See id. at 643. 
221. See id. at 643-44. 
222. See id. at 644. 
223. See id. at 651. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. 450 u.s. 398 (1981). 
227. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413. 
228. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 407. 
229. Id. 
230. ld. at 409. 
231. ld. (quoting Bellatti 11, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979)). 
232. See id. at 413. 
233. See id. at 413-20 (Powell,]., concurring). 
76 UNIVERSI1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO lAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
rights if it does not allow the adolescent to avoid parental notification 
where that notification would not be in the minor's best interests.234 
Mter Matheson, in a string of decisions between 1983 and 1990, 
the Court reviewed a number of state statutes that attempted to limit a 
minor's right to an abortion.235 The Court upheld the laws, even if the 
laws required parental consent,236 provided they allowed for judicial 
bypass, whereby a minor could demonstrate that she was sufficiently 
mature or, alternatively, that terminating the pregnancy would be in 
her best interest.237 The increasing split among the Justices became 
notable. No single justice could secure a majority for an entire 
opinion. 238 
Twice during the 1980s and 1990s, the Court has produced clear 
majorities in cases involving minors and parental consent require-
ments.239 In Casey, seven justices agreed that Pennsylvania's provisions 
governing parental consent were constitutional.240 While the Court 
found parts of the law did impose an undue burden on a woman's 
right to choose,241 the consent provision, requiring the informed con-
sent of one parent, was upheld because the law provided for adequate 
judicial bypass procedures.242 In Lambert v. Wicklund,243 a unanimous 
Supreme Court upheld Montana's Parental Notice of Abortion Act.244 
The act requires the physician provide a minor's parent(s) with forty-
eight hours' notice prior to performing the abortion.245 The Montana 
law allows a minor to seek a judicial waiver of this notice require-
234. See id. at 420 ( Powell, J., concurring). 
235. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 
(1990); Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashuoft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); 
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
(1976); Bellotti l, 428 u.s. 132 (1976). 
236. See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983). 
237. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93. 
238. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see also Planned 
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) . 
239. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997). 
240. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900 (O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., joint opin-
ion); see also id. at 944, 971 (Scalia,]., concurring and dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., 
and Thomas and White,JJ.). 
241. See id. at 895. The spousal notification provision is an undue burden because "it 
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." !d. 
242. See id. at 899. "Under these precedents [Akron l , 462 U.S. 416,440 (1983); Akron ll, 
497 U.S. 502, 510-19 (1989); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643-644 (1979)), in our view, the 
one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass procedure are constitutional." !d. 
243. 520 u.s. 292 (1997). 
244. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 299. 
245. See id. at 293 (citing MoNT. CoDE ANN.§§ 50-20-204 to -212 (1995)). 
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ment. 246 Measured against the requirements established in Bellotti II, 
the act withstood constitutional challenge.247 
Despite some disagreement concerning the burden imposed by 
particular statutory schemes,248 the legal principles governing paren-
tal consent and notification have remained consistent over the past 
twenty years.249 A majolity of justices have consistently upheld state 
statutes that call for parental consent or notification as long as the 
statute offers an alternative procedure for a minor to obtain an abor-
tion. 2so Those procedures must meet the criteria established in Belktti 
IL Specifically, a judicial bypass must be confidential and expedi-
246. &e id. 
247. See id. In addition to guaranteeing a minor's anonymity and an expeditious han-
dling of her petition, Montana's judicial bypass provision directed the court to grant the 
petition if it found any one of the following conditions: "(i) the minor [was] 'sufficiently 
mature to decide whether to have an abortion'; (ii) 'there [was] evidence of a pattern of 
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse' . .. ; or (iii) 'the notificati<m of a parent or guardian 
[was) not in tile best interests of the [minor)." !d. at 294 (quoting MoNT. Com: A NN. 
§§ 50-20-212(4), (5) (1995)). It was argued that the third pro~ision was unconstirutionally 
narrow because, as written, the provision did not require the authorization of a waiver 
whenever an abortion was determined to be in the minor's best interests. See id. at 297- 98. 
Rather, the provision required a minor to demonstrate that notification would not be in 
her best interests. &e id. The critical question, then, was whether the second condition 
satisfied the Bellotti II requirement that a minor be allowed "to bypass the consent require-
ment if she establishe[d) that the abortion would be in her best interests." U at 295; see 
also Bellotti If, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979). The Court relied on its analysis in Akron /lin 
which the Court upheld a substantially similar bypass provision by equating the require-
ment tl1at a minor show notice was not in her best interests with one requiring a minor to 
show an abortion, without notice, was in her best interests. Lam.belt, 520 U.S. at 295-96 
(citing Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 (1989)). Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's reasoning 
because it suggested a minor must show that an "abortion without notification is in her 
best interests." Lambert, 520 U.S. at 302 (Stevens,]., concurring). According to Justice Ste-
vens, if a minor had already shown an abortion would be in her best interests, it may follow 
lhat notice would not be in her best interest~. !d. at 301 n*. This is so because a minor who 
is opposed to the notice requirement could be deterred from seekjng an abortion which a 
court had already determined to be in her best interests. See id. at 302 n.*. Furthermore, 
Justice Stevens pointed out that under the plain language of the statute, if a minor could 
show notification was not in her best interests, she would not be required to further show 
that an abortion would be in her best interests. See id. at 302. Thus, either showing satisfied 
the conditions of the Montana provisions and met the !Jellotti II requirement. See id. 
248. See, e.g., Akron ll, 497 U.S. 509, 527 (1989) (Black.mun, J. , dissenting) (describing 
the statutory scheme as an "obstacle course" for minors to complete before they can exer-
cise their rights). 
249. See, e.g., Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
250. See, e.g., Case:y, 505 U.S. at 899 (O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ. , joint opin-
ion); see id. at 944 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and 
White and Thomas, JJ.). 
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tious.251 It must also allow a mature minor to show that she is capable 
of making an informed decision without parental guidance, or failing 
that, that an abortion would be in her best interest.252 
E. Use of Public Funds, Employees, and Facilities 
The Supreme Court has addressed the use of public resources for 
abortion services in three contexts. First, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether states could legally deny Medicaid assistance for non-
therapeutic abortions under Title XIX. 253 Second, the Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which prohib-
ited the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse recipients for the costs of 
abortions.254 Third, the Court examined a Missouri state regulation 
that prohibited performance of abortions by public employees and 
that banned the use of public facilities for abortion procedures.255 
The Court has consistently ruled in favor of legislation that limits 
abortion funding. 256 
1. Medicaid Assistance for Non-Therapeutic Abortions Under Tide 
XIX 
In 1977, the Court examined three cases challenging the validity 
of state-imposed restrictions on Medicaid assistance for abortion serv-
ices.257 In each case, the Court held that the state's interest in encour-
aging childbirth was sufficiently compelling to justify the 
restriction. 258 
In Beal v. Doe, 259 the Court considered whether Title XIX re-
quired states to fund non-therapeutic abortions. Title XIX directed 
participating states to "establish 'reasonable standards .. . for deter-
mining ... the extent of medical assistance'" which are consistent 
with Title XIX's objectives.260 The Pennsylvania regulation limited 
251. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 294-95; see also Akron ll, 497 U.S. at512; Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 
at 644. 
252. See Akro11 I, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983) (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44). 
253. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 440 (1977). 
254. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
255. SeeWebsterv. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,509-10 (1989). 
256. See Bea~ 432 U.S. at 445-47; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1976); Poelker v. 
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Harris, 448 U.S. al 326; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507. 
257. See generally Bea~ 432 U.S. at 438; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464; Poelker, 432 U.S. at 519. 
258. See Beat, 432 U.S. at 446-47; Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-80 (1977); Poelker, 432 U.S. al 
521; Ha17is, 448 U.S. at 326; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-08. 
259. 432 u.s. 438 (1977). 
260. Bea~ 432 U.S. at 441 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l7) (1970 ed., Supp. V). 
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Medicaid assistance to "medically necessary" assistance.261 The Court 
found that Title XIX gives the states broad discretion when it allocates 
Medicaid funds. 262 According to the Court, Pennsylvania's restriction 
was reasonable because the commonwealth had a valid interest in pro-
tecting human life throughout a woman's pregnancy.263 Thus, there-
striction was reasonable within the meaning of Title XIX. Had the 
regulation not recognized an exception for medically necessary abor-
tions, it may have violated the act.264 
The grant of certiorari in Beal was limited to that statutory ques-
tion.265 The Court considered whether a regulation favoring child-
birth over abortion violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
in Maher v. Roe, 266 a companion case to BeaL 267 In Maher, the plaintiffs 
challenged a Connecticut regulation similar to that in effect in Penn-
sylvania which limited abortions to those deemed medically 
necessary.268 
The Court determined that the district court erred when it held 
abortion was a fundamental right and subjected the regulation to 
strict scrutiny.269 Instead, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding 
that indigence is not a suspect classification, which included indigent, 
pregnant women. Therefore, the district court should have deter-
mined only whether the state had a rational basis for imposing the 
"medical necessity limitation'' of Medicaid spending. 270 The Court 
held that the state's time-honored interest in protecting potential life 
was sufficient to justifY the regulation.271 The failure to fund non-ther-
apeutic abortions was not equivalent to a direct interference with the 
right to have an abortion protected by Roe. 272 
Poe!Rer v. Doe,273 the third case in the trilogy, upheld a directive 
issued by St. Louis's mayor which prohibited the use of public re-
261. ld. 
262. See id. at 444. 
263. See id, at 445-46. 
264. See id. at 444 (stating that if the regulation had not recognized an exception for 
medically necessary abortions "serious starutory questions might be presented"). 
265. Ser id. at 443-44. 
266. 432 u.s. 464 (1976). 
267. See Maher, 432 U.S. 467, 470 (1977). 
268. See id. at 466-67. 
269. See id. at 4 71. 
270. &e id. (stating that the court "has never held that financial need alone identifies a 
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis") (citing San Antonio &h. Dist v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 29 (1973)). 
271. Set' id. at 4 78. 
272. See id. at 474. 
273. 432 u.s. 519 (1977). 
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sources for abortion services. 274 The Court found that Maher con-
trolled the issue.275 
2. The Constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment 
In 1976, Congress adopted a ban on the use of federal funds for 
abortion services with limited exceptions.276 Harris v. McRae277 chal-
lenged the constitutionality of that ban.278 The Court relied on Maher 
and rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to the Hyde Amendment on the 
grounds that it interfered with a Fifth Amendment due process279 
right to an abortion.280 The denial of public assistance is not 
equivalent to interfering with the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy.281 The Hyde Amendment282 was more restrictive than the state 
regulations upheld in Beaf283 and Maher.284 The Hyde Amendment 
did not create a general exception for medically necessary abor-
tions.285 This made no difference to the Court's analysis.286 Instead, 
the fact that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion does not 
imply an affirmative right to government funds in furtherance of that 
choice.287 As in Maher, the Court rejected the argument that a court 
must subject "selective subsidization" of some medical procedures to 
274. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521. 
275. See id. 
276. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). 
277. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
278. See id. at 301-02. 
279. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (providing that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law"). 
280. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. 
281. See id. at 317 n.l9 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 474 n.8 (1977)). 
282. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 302 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926). 
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform 
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus 
were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the 
victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to 
a law enforcement agency or public health service. 
/d. 
283. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977). 
284. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
285. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17. 
286. See id. 
287. See id. at 317-18. Appellees argued tha t the Hyde Amendment violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the amendment incorporated Roman Catholic Church doctrines 
into the law. See id. a t 319. Appellees also challenged the amendment on the basis that it 
violated the Free Exercise Clause because a "woman's decision to seek a medically neces-
sary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs under certain Protestant or Jewish 
tenets." Id. The Court dismissed both First Amendment challenges on the basis that 
although the Hyde Amendment coincides with Roman Catholic doctrines, its primary pur-
pose is the allocation of public money. See id. at 319-20. Thus, because the law's primary 
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strict scrutiny.288 The Hyde Amendment did not affect a constitution-
ally suspect classification and was rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.289 
3. Public Employees and Facilities 
In 1989, a divided Court upheld a Missouri statute which prohib-
ited public employees from performing abortions and banned the use 
of public facilities for non-therapeutic abortion services.290 By a 5-4 
vote, a majority of the Court upheld those provisions.291 The majority 
found the restrictions to be within the Court's analysis in Maher and 
Poelker.292 That is, the state law did not impose an obstacle to procur-
ing an abortion. Insofar as the Missouri statute reflected a preference 
for childbirth, the Court found this a permissible state interest. 293 
F. Generalizations 
After twenty-five years of litigation and significant changes in the 
make-up of the Court, some general principles have remained con-
stant. Despite Presidents Reagan's and Bush's aggressive efforts to 
reshape the Court for the specific purpose of overruling Roe,294 the 
Court continues to recognize a woman's fundamental right to abor-
tion.295 That right, however, is limited when the state has a sufficiently 
important competing interest.296 While a majority of the Court has 
abandoned the trimester framework,297 the woman's interest remains 
strongest in her first trimester and diminishes over time. Viability is 
the moment when the state 's interest in protecting life is most 
com pen in g. 298 
The Court has always recognized that a state may-and ought 
to-assure a woman's informed consent prior to an abortion.299 Over 
purpose is secular, neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, it does not violate the First 
Amendment. See id. 
288. ld. at 321-22. 
289. See id. at 322- 23. 
290. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-09 (1988). 
291. See id. at 498, 51 I. 
292. See id. at 508-09. 
293. See id. at 508-09. 
294. See discussion supra Part D.A. 
295. See Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846 (]992) (O'Connor, 
Kennedy and Souter, J.J., joint opinion). 
296. See discussion supra Parts ll.A and B. 
297. See sufrra note 129 and accompanying text. 
298. See discussion supra Part ll.A. 
299. See discussion supra Part n.B. 
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time, the Court has abandoned its insistence on state neutrality be-
tween abortion and childbirth. 300 It now allows the state to express a 
preference for childbirth by requiring health care providers to give 
women seeking an abortion information designed to persuade them 
to give birth rather than to terminate a pregnancy. 301 The Court will 
uphold such measures provided they do not amount to an undue bur-
den on the woman's right to choose.302 
The Court has consistently prevented states from imposing either 
a spousal consent or spousal notification requirement.303 A consent 
requirement is, in effect, a third party veto in conflict with a woman's 
right to choose. A notification requirement cannot be justified by any 
of the asserted state interests. 304 
In contrast, the Court has consistently upheld parental consent 
and notification provisions as long as those laws contained basic pro-
tections.3os Specifically, the Court requires a guarantee of judicial by-
pass for mature minors or when consent or notification are in conflict 
with the minor's best interests.306 
Finally, the Court has consistently upheld provisions that deny 
the use of public resources for abortion procedures. 307 Essentially lib-
ertarian in its view,308 the Court has determined that the state and 
federal governments cannot interfere with a woman's right to choose, 
but governments also cannot be compelled to provide funds for her to 
obtain an abortion.309 
III. Reliance on Polls 
Supreme Court justices and commentators, who criticize Roe and 
other decisions as being anti-majoritarian, argue that legislation is the 
measure of democracy. Thus, when the Court overturns legislation, it 
is acting contrary to popular wilJ.310 If one assumes that legislation 
reflects majoritarian sentiment, one cannot doubt this conclusion. 
300. See id. 
301. See id. 
302. See id. 
303. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
304. See id. 
305. See discussion supra Part li.D. 
306. See id. 
307. See discussion supra Parts Il.E.l-2. 
308. See TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1345-47 (criticizing the Court's position). 
309. See discussion supra Parts II.E.l-2. 
310. See discussion supra Part II. 
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However, legislation does not always reflect majoritarian sentimcnt3 11 
as reflected in public opinion polls. Polls, of course, have limitations. 
This section reviews some of those limitations. Jn the final analysis, 
however, this article uses polling data because they are the only mean-
ingful way to measure popular sentiment. Further, despite obvious 
flaws, polls that produce similar responses over time suggest some 
measure of accuracy. 
A. Limits of Polling Data 
The mass media is addicted to polling data and about 75% of 
Americans-polled, of course!-believe that opinion polls are a good 
thing.s12 At best, public opinion polls are a rough measure of majority 
sentiment. All polls suffer from some flaws, including sampling errors, 
design errors, non-availability rates, and refusal rates. SIS Among other 
problems, questions may be poorly worded or placed in a bad 
sequence.314 
Pollsters routinely report sampling error; that is, they report the 
percentage margin of error in a given sample.315 However, more sub-
stantial problems may undercut the value of any given poll. The most 
significant errors, perhaps, relate to the form, wording, and context of 
survey questions.316 Complex issues pose difficult problems for poll-
sters. H the issue is complex, the typical question asking whether one 
favors or opposes a stated position is a poor measure of that person's 
opinion.317 
As observed by one commentator, "results of a survey vary signifi-
cantly witl1 rather inconspicuous changes in wording and format."318 
For example, in a 1985 survey on abortion, the pollster asked three 
different questions. The first question was: ''What do you think about 
abortion? Should it be legal as it is now, legal only in such cases as 
saving the life of the mother, rape or incest, or should it not be per-
mitted at all?"319 The second question asked: "Which of these state-
311. See discussion supm Pan I. C. 
312. S~ Alva Stewart, Public Opinian Po/Lr: Benefits and Dangers: A Brief Checklist, in PuBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION SERJES: B1 SUOCRAI'HY # P 2641 at 2 (1989) (stating that "three OUt of four 
Americans believe opinion polls are a good thing"). 
313. See id. at 3-4. 
314. See id. 
315. See MICHAEL. WHEELER, LIES, DAMN LI10s, AND STA11STICS 272-73 (1976). 
316. See Stewart, supra note 312, at 3-4. 
317. Sef. WHEELER, supra note 315, at 279-80. 
318. !d. at 282. 
319. H ERBERT AsHER, PoLLINC AND TH£ Puauc, WHAT EVERY CITIZEN SHouLD KNow 98 
(4th ed. 1998). 
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ments comes closest to your opinion? Abortion is the same thing as 
murdering a child, or abortion is not murder because a fetus isn't 
really a person."320 The third question asked: "Do you agree or disa-
gree with the following statement? Abortion sometimes is the best 
course in a bad situation."321 
One would predict that if a majority favored abortion in question 
one, a majority would also conclude that abortion is not murder. How-
ever, the responses contained some surprises: 40% supported abor-
tion and wanted it to remain "[l]egal as is now," while 40% said it 
should be "[1] egal only to save mother, rape or incest."322 Hence, 80% 
concluded that abortion ought to be available under some circum-
stances. At the same time, 55% agreed that abortion is "the same thing 
as murdering a child. . .. "323 Also somewhat surprising is that only 
66% agreed that abortion is sometimes the best course in a bad situa-
tion,324 while 80% answering the first question approved the law as is 
or a law allowing abortion to save the mother or to terminate a preg-
nancy resulting from rape or incest. 325 
Those results suggest obvious inconsistencies. It is possible that a 
number of people believe abortion is appropriate even though they 
think it is murder. However, other factors may explain what appear to 
be inconsistent results. The poll does not take into account the possi-
bility that respondents may not have thought carefully about their 
own beliefs. Similarly, presumably 14% of those responding believe 
that abortion should be permitted under certain circumstances but do 
not believe that a person choosing to have an abortion is making the 
best decision in a bad situation. 
People seeking to use polling data can draw different inferences 
from the responses. Highlighting answers to the second question al-
lows one to argue that a majority of respondents must have doubts 
about abortion because they believe that abortion is equivalent to 
murder. Focusing on that question ignores other evidence which indi-
cates that significant m,Yorities favor abortion under certain 
circumstances. 326 
320. Id. 
321. Jd. 
322. /d. 
323. Jd. 
324. See id. 
325. See id. 
326. See THE GALLUP PoLL MoNTHLY, Aug. 1996, 33 (poll results accumulated from 
1975-1996 showed a range of 75-84% favor legal abortion in at least some circumstances). 
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Another possible explanation for inconsistent responses may be 
that the respondents may not be sufficiently informed to be stating 
"genuine opinions," but only "nonattitudes."327 Polling the unin-
formed measures little that is meaningful. For example, some pollsters 
have designed questions that ask respondents about their views on 
Supreme Court decisions. 328 At best, such a question measures the 
limited information the respondent may have about the Supreme 
Court decision as reported in mainstream media. This information 
can be notoriously incomplete or inaccurate.3 29 
Most of the criticisms of polling data focus on problems that arise 
with specific polls. As demonstrated by extensive social science litera-
ture, properly designed and interpreted, polls are meaningfuJ.330 The 
millions of dollars spent on polling demonstrate more than mere faith 
in polling; rather, well designed measurement instruments do gener-
ate significant results.331 
IV. The Polling Data and Court Doctrine 
This section reviews the public opinion polling data332 over the 
past twenty-five years that have attempted to measure public views on 
questions relating to abortion and compares that data with the 
Supreme Court doctrine developed in Part III of this article. Consis-
tent with this article 's hypothesis, the data show significant agreement 
between Supreme Court doctrine and public opinion. 
327. AsHER, supra note 319, at 28. 
328. See GEORGE GALLuP, JR., TH.E GALLUP PoLL, Pusuc OPINION 1986 49 (1986) (re-
producing Survey# 261-G, originally released Feb. 20, 1986).·"The U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that a woman may go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any time during the first three 
months of pregnancy. Do you favor or oppose this ruling?" /d. See also GOORCE GALLUP, J R., 
THE GALLUP PoLL, Pusuc OPINION 1989 20 (1989) (reproducing Survey #GO 89024, origi-
nally released j an. 22, 1989). "In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot place 
restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. 
Would you like to see this ruling overturned, or n ot?" !d. 
329. See Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinilm and the Rehnquist Court, 74JuoiCATURE, 322, 
327 (1991) (discussing the fact that a high level of public awareness of Supreme Court 
cases does not mean that its rulings are accurately perceived). 
330. See BARBARA HINRSON CRAIC & DAVID M. O 'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN Pou. 
TICS 246-48 (1993). 
331. See id. 
332. This research attempts to identify the m,Yor opinion poUs that focus on the abor-
tion question. The Gallup Organization has regularly polled public opinion on abortion 
and those results are generally well regarded. Hence, these polls receive special attention 
in this section. 
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A. A Right to Abortion 
I . The Polls Show That Majority Will and Court Doctrine Are in 
Agreement 
Prior to 1975, the year Gallup began its annual survey, the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center ("NORC") conducted two significant 
polls, in 1965 and 1973.333 Both NORC polls demonstrated over-
whelming support for abortion under some circumstances. In 1965, 
for example, 73% of those polled agreed that abortion should be 
available if a woman's health was in danger; 59% and 57% supported 
a woman's right to abortion in a case of rape or serious birth defect, 
respectively.334 Public opinion did not support an unrestrained right 
to abortion. Fewer than a quarter of those polled supported abortion 
in cases that might be characterized as elective abortions.335 
By 1973, the year Roe was decided, 91% of those polled supported 
abortion in cases of necessity for maternal health, 81% in cases of 
rape, and 82% in cases of birth defects. 336 A majority favored the right 
to abortion in cases where low income ne<:essitated the decision. 337 A 
plurality supported a woman's right to abort in cases where the wo-
man was unmarried and did not want children.338 
Mter 1975, the most reliable data comes from the Gallup Organi-
zation. The standard questions did not provide particularly subtle 
measurements of public opinion. The standard questions asked 
whether abortion should be legal under any circumstances, under cer-
tain circumstances, or illegal under all circumstances.339 The results of 
these polls, taken throughout the post-Roe era, indicate that an over-
333. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 330, at 249. 
334. See id. at 250. 
335. See id. Elective abortions are those undergone for reasons of "convenience," rather 
than for medical reasons. A woman who decides that a child would interfere with her 
career is having an elective abortion. If she chooses to have an abortion because the preg-
nancy would have a detrimental effect on her physical or mental health, it would be char-
acterized as medically justified. The term "convenjence" is used to distinguish between 
these two types of abortions. It is not used \vith intent to trivialize the abortion decision. See 
also note 352 infra. 
336. See The General Social Survey 1973, July 1973, Public opinion Online, available in 
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
337. See id. 
338. See id. 
339. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL, PUBLIC OPtNION 1980 171 (1980) (re-
producing the results of Survey# 159-G, originally released Aug. 28, 1980); GEORGE GAL-
LUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL, PuBLIC OPINION 1981 116 (1981) (reproducing the results of 
Survey# 173-G, originally released May 31, 1981); GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL, 
PuBLIC 0PtNION 1983 140 (1983) (reproducing the results of Survey# 217-G, originally 
released July 31, 1983). 
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whelming majority of Americans polled support abortion, at least 
under certain circumstances.340 For example, in 1975, 21% supported 
abortion under any circumstances and 54% under certain circum-
stances.341 In 1977, the numbers were 22% and 55%; in 1980, 25% 
and 53%; in 1983, 23% and 58%; and in 1989, 29% and 51%.342 In 
1990 and 1992, 31% supported abortion under any circumstance and 
53% supported it under certain circumstances; in 1996, the numbers 
were 25% and 58%.343 
In 1978, Gallup also asked a series of questions intended to mea-
sure respondents' views of abortion during different trimesters. The 
data suggest that support for a woman's right to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy decreases over the course of the pregnancy.344 
Other Gallup polls attempted to frame questions about abortion 
rights differently. For example, in 1981, pollsters asked whether the 
respondent approved of the Supreme Court ruling that any woman 
can end her pregnancy during the first three months. 34" Approxi-
mately equal numbers approved and disapproved the ruling.346 In 
1983, 50% approved of the ruling, while only 43% disapproved.347 In 
1986, approval went down to 45%, while disapproval rose to 45%.348 
In 1989, 57% opposed overruling Roe in response to a slightly differ-
ent question: "In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot 
place restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion during the first 
three months of pregnancy. Would you like to see this ruling over-
turned, or not?"349 
2. Interpreting the Opinion Polls 
Some of Roe's critics cite public opinion polls to suggest that the 
public does not support the Supreme Court's abortion rights case law. 
The authors of Between Two Absolutes, for example, note that both pro-
340. See id. 
341. See TnE GALLuP PoLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 33. 
342. See id. 
343. See id. 
344. SeeTHE GALLUP PoLL Mo:-.'THLY,July 31, 1983, at 139-41 (reporting the results of 
Survey# 217-G). 
345. See GEoRGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL, PuBu c OPINION 1981 112 (1981) . 
346. SeeTHE GALLUP REPORT, jan./Feb., 1986, at 18 (asking: "The U.S. Supreme Coun 
has ruled that a woman may go to a doctor to end a pregnancy at any time during the first 
three months of pregnancy. Do you favor or oppose this ruling?") The results showed that 
45% favored the ruling, 45% opposed the ruling and 10% had no opinion. See id. 
347. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1983 139 (1983). 
348. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLuP PoLL, PuBLIC OPINION 1986 49 (1986). 
349. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLuP PoLL, PuBLIC OPINION 1989 20 (1989). 
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choice and pro-life advocates claim that polls support their respective 
positions.350 They observe that "neither the pro-life nor pro-choice 
movement has the support of an absolute majority of Americans."351 
Public attitudes over time have remained remarkably stable. A major-
ity has "hovered near allowing abortion" in four of six circumstances 
best described as "traumatic circumstances," and between one and two 
circumstances best described as "elective circumstances."352 
Other authors have found a "strong division in public opinion on 
abortion,"353 based on data collected over a ten-year period. These 
authors relied on responses to a NORC poll, asking whether a married 
woman ought to be able to obtain a legal abortion if sh e does not want 
any more children.354 
Roe does give a woman greater freedom in choosing an abortion 
than the public seems to support. At some points in time, public ac-
ceptance of abortion has seemed virtually identical to the protection 
afforded by Roe. 355 However, while most of the polls indicate that th e 
public would not support a choice based simply on convenience, ss6 
Roe does n ot allow the state to inquire into the reason for a woman 's 
choice. That is, while Roe suggested that some limitations may be im-
posed during the second trimester, her choice during the first trimes-
ter is unfettered.~57 Subsequent case law left observers wondering 
whether a state could impose any significant limitations during the 
second trimester.358 At a minimum, the Court does not allow a state to 
force a woman to justify her choice. This leaves her free to choose an 
abortion for convenience. 
Focusing on the area of disagreement between public opinion 
and the broad right protected in Roe ignores significant areas of agree-
ment. For example, when Roe was decided, a majority of people polled 
350. See CooK. e:-r AL., supra note 33, at 37. 
351. !d. 
352. Id. at 35- 37 (defining traumatic circumsr.ances as: "mother 's health, fetal defect, 
and rape .. . " and elective or "social" circumstances defined as: "poverty, unmarried wo-
man, or a couple who wants no more children"). 
353. j oHNSON & CANoN, supra nore 64, at12-13. 
354. See id. at 13 (asking: "Please tell me whether or not you th ink it should be possible 
for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any 
more children."). 
355. SeeGEORCE GALLuP, JR., THE GALLUP P OLL, Pusuc OPINION 1980 171- 174 (1980). 
356. See e.g. Public GeneraUy Supports a Woman s Right to Abortion, TH£ GALLUP POLL 
MONTHLY, Aug. 28, 1996, at 32 (finding that only 32% of those polled would support legal 
abortions in cases where the family cannot afford more children). 
357. See discussion supra Part 1l.A. 
358. See discussion supra Part !LA. 
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favored the liberalization of abortion laws.359 Numerous polls since 
that time demonstrate that the ovenvhelming majority favors more lib-
eral abortion rights than those prevailing prior to Roe.360 
Further, while a majority may not favor the precise rights af-
forded in Roe, only a small percentage of those polled would have 
abortion forbidden outright.361 For example, in 1988, 17% urged that 
abortion be illegal under all circumstances.362 Twenty-four percent fa-
vored no restrictions on abortion.363 Of the remaining 57% (those 
favoring abortion under certain circumstances), an overwhelming ma-
jority favored abortion if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 
or would create a severe health hazard. 364 Sixty percent favored the 
right to abortion in a case in which the baby would be deformed.365 
When added to those who favored abortion under any circumstances, 
about 65% of those sampled favored a right to abortion if the child 
would be born deformed. 366 
3. Legislation on Abortion Is Often Anti-Majoritarian 
Comparing public opinion with Supreme Court decisions tells 
only part of the story. When the Court's critics attack the Court as 
elitist or as anti-majoritarian, they compare the Court with the ideol-
ogy of the political branches of government.367 However, if one com-
pares the Court's holding in a case like Roe with positions taken by the 
"representative" branches of government, the Court's performance 
looks closer to public opinion than does that of many elected officials. 
For example, in 1981, President Reagan, perhaps as a courtesy to 
the Christian Coalition that helped him win the presidency,368 sup-
ported the Helms-Hyde Human Life Bill.369 Typical of a number of 
359. See Maris A. Vinovksis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate 
Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MlcH. L. REv. 1750, 1755 (1979). 
360. See id. at 1753-54. 
361. See THE GALLUP MoNTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 33 (finding that no more than 22% fa-
vored an outright ban of abortion in 20 polls conducted between 1975 and 1996). 
362. See id. 
363. See id. 
364. See GEORGE GALLUP, jR., THE GALLUP PoLL, Pusuc OPINION 1988 208-09 (1988) 
(reporting on a survey released in October 1988 which found that 85% of respondents 
approved of legal abortions in cases of rape or incest, and 94% approved of legal abortions 
if the mother's life is endangered). 
365. See id. 
366. See id. at 20(H)8. 
367. See supra notes 3, 33, 63 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
369. S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong. (1981); see also joHNSON & CA-
NON, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the 1980 presidential campaign). 
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bills submitted to Congress in the early 1980s,370 the Human Life Bill 
contained a provision designed to limit federal court access to plain-
tiffs bringing certain kinds of cases involving specific federal rights. 371 
Section 1 of the Human Life Bill also attempted to overrule Roe~m by 
providing that "actual human life exists from conception. "373 
Had the Human Life Bill been adopted, its proponents hoped 
that the Court would defer to Congress's determination of when 
human life began,374 an issue that the Court was unable or unwilling 
to decide in Roe. 375 Although the effect of the Human Life Bill was 
debated, section 1 would almost certainly have extended due process 
liberty protection to the fetus.376 Were the fetus entitled to due pro-
cess protection, not only would Roe be overruled but the Human Life 
Bill would also have destroyed the states' ability to legalize abortion.377 
This is so because a state law allowing a woman to choose abortion at 
any time in her pregnancy would implicate the fetus's liberty interest, 
an interest which could not be denied without due process. Taking a 
370. See Baucus & Kay, supra note 24, at 992 n.18 (listing several bills on issues such as 
school prayer and abortion which would have limited the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
371. SeeS. 158, 97th Cong., § 2 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 2 (1981) (providing 
that no inferior Article III court "shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, 
temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment" in any case involving state 
or local laws limiting the right to an abortion); see also Michael Vitiello, Congressional With-
drawal of Jurisdictirm from Federal Courts: A Reply to Professor UiUio, 28 LoY. L. RE.V. 61. 61-63 
(1982) (noting that the effect of section 2 of the Human Life Bill wds to limit the initial 
determination of the constitutionality of abortion legislation to stale courts) . 
372. SeeS. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981) (defining, for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the beginning of human life); see also Vitiello, su.pra 
note 371, at &2 (finding that the Human Life Bill would overrule Roe in substance because 
it extended the constitutional protection of liberty to the fetus). 
373. S. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981). 
374. See llddo, supra note 33, at 1088 (asserting that the Supreme Court "has, in the 
past, allowed Congress to differ with it on determinations relevam to the [F)ourteenth 
[A)mendment by deferring to the congressional view"). 
375. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (explaining that the Court will not 
resolve the question of when life begins because "[w]hen those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, 
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, i!; not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer"). 
376. See Vitiello, mpra note 371, at &2. 
377. SeeS. 158, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., § 1 (1981) (stating that 
"for the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment not to deprive persons of life without due process of law, human life shall 
be deemed to exist from conception"). 
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fetus's life without some compelling competing interest simply cannot 
be squared with due process.378 
Some efforts by state legislatures would have resulted in similar 
restrictions. For example, legislation at issue in Webster included a pre-
amble that promised protection for fetal life from the moment of con-
ception.379 The Missouri statute included legislative findings that the 
"life of each human being begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being."380 
Had the Court upheld the preamble, the statute would have had an 
effect similar to that of the Human Life Bill. 
Examples like these, hardly unique in the abortion controversy, 
demonstrate that elected officials have often acted in direct contra-
vention of majority sentiment.381 By contrast, the Supreme Court's 
long-standing affirmation of Roe's core holding has been supported in 
whole or in large part by significant m£Yorities of those polled.382 This 
is demonstrated by various polls that have asked whether the person 
interviewed favored a decision to overrule Roe383 or to enact a consti-
tutional amendment which would make abortion illegal.!:\84 
4. Where Court and Public Opinions Do Not Agree 
Insofar as poll results are not entirely consonant with Roe, the 
pollsters have seldom attempted to refine their questions to measure 
whether those polled would subscribe to the Supreme Court's precise 
holding in Roe in light of other plausible alternatives. For example, 
most of the Gallup polls suggest that a majority of those polled do not 
favor abortion as a matter of "convenience," but do if the mother's 
health, including psychological health, is at risk.!l85 
378. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 {maintaining that only a compelling state interests can 
justify abridging a fundamental right, such as a fetus 's right to life, which was recognized at 
conception under the Human Life Bill). 
379. Set Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504 n.4 {1988) {citing 
Mo. REv. STAT.§ 1.205.2 {1986)). 
380. !d. 
381. Set' ] O IINSON & CA.'ION, supra note 64, at 151 ; sa also discussion supra note 96. 
382. See supra notes 333-49 and accompanying text. 
383. Set Larry Hugick, Abortion: Majority Critical of Abortion Decision, But Most Amtricans 
Favor Some Nt!W Restrictions, TilE GALLUP REPORT,july 1989, at 5, 8 (reporting that 58% were 
opposed to overturning the Court decision in R.oe); see also David W. Moore et al., Public 
Generally Supjxms a Woman's Right to Abortion, THE GALLUP Pou Mor-:-n tLY, Aug. 1996, at 29, 
35 {reporting that 59% opposed a constitutional ban on abortion). 
384. See Vinovkis, supra note 359, at 1761 {reporting that in 1976, 32% of the voters 
surveyed favored a constitutional amendment making abortion illegal while 56% opposed 
such an amendment). 
385. See discussion supra Pan IV.A.l. 
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However, if Roe were curtailed to reflect this view, implementa-
tion would impose practical problems. For example, would the physi-
cian have to discuss with the woman the basis of her decision to 
determine whether she was making her choice simply out of conven-
ience or because her mental health was at risk? Would the physician 
be bound by a woman's stated reason? Or, for example, if a woman 
asserted that her psychological health was at risk, could the physician 
refuse the abortion because the physician doubted her explanation? 
Or if a woman stated that she could not afford additional children, a 
reason that a majority might not support, could a physician nonethe-
less perform the procedure because the physician believed that the 
woman 's mental health would be adversely affected if she did not have 
the abortion? Or would the decision be taken out of the hands of the 
physician entirely? In other words, a scheme that would parallel ma-
jority sentiment might impose other impediments that would lead a 
majority to reject the regulation. Upon closer examination, Roe might 
be the best compromise. 
The Supreme Court has modified Roe in ways that allow the states 
to influence a woman's choice on abortion. In early cases, the Court 
limited the kind of information that a state could require as part of an 
\ informed consent provision.386 In effect, the Court required that a 
state remain neutral in its position towards a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy and could not "intimidate women into continuing 
pregnancies."387 More recently, the Court has found that a state has a 
"profound interest in potential life," and may take measures "to per-
suade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.".388 Under Casey, 
a state is free to discourage abortions for convenience. 389 In fact, a 
state may even attempt to discourage abortions in situations where a 
m~ority of Americans believe that the woman's right ought to be un-
fettered. For example, a majority favors an unfettered right to an 
abortion when the child may be born with a deformity. However, 
under current Court doctrine, the state is free to discourage the 
mother from electing an abortion in this circumstance. 
Despite the assertions by critics, the Court has not deviated widely 
from majoritarian sentiment. In fact, by comparison to the policies of 
386. See discussion supra Part II. B. 
387. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 759 (1986). 
388. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 545 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) . 
389. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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Presidents Reagan and Bush and to some legislatures,390 the Court has 
held a steady course that, over time, closely mirrors the sentiment of a 
majority of Americans. 
B. Informed Consent and the Twenty-four Hour Waiting Period 
Polling data concerning the related issues of informed consent 
and a twenty-four hour waiting period are illuminating. Initially at 
odds with popular sentiment, the Court's view has moderated wwa.rds 
popular opinion. 
From the beginning of its abortion case law, the Supreme Court 
has upheld informed consent provisions-at least where those provi-
sions leave to the physician the decision of what information to com-
municate.39l In addition, it has upheld the twenty-four hour waiting 
period as "a reasonable measure to implement the State's interest in 
protecting the life of the unborn."392 Pollsters have extensively mea-
sured the public's support for an informed consent requirement and 
a twenty-four hour waiting period. The results have been consistent 
over time, with a large majority favoring these kinds of require-
ments. 393 For example, in 1992, 86% of those responding to a Gallup 
poll favored a requirement that a doctor inform a patient of the alter-
natives to abortion prior to the procedure.1194 The percentage favoring 
such a requirement remained the same in 1996.395 
With regard to a twenty-four hour waiting period, Gallup polls 
reveal support ranging from 73 to 74% approval ratings.396 Other 
390. See supra notes 367-84 and accompanying text. 
391. See discussion supra Part ll.B. 
392. Casey, 476 U.S. at 885. 
393. Compare Larry Hugick & Lydia Saad, Abortion: P11blic Support Cft·ows for Roe v. Wade, 
Tm: GALLUP Pou MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 5, 7 (reporting that 86% favor a law requiring 
doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before performing the procedure; 
73% favor a law requiring women seeking abortions to wait 24 hours before having the 
procedure done), witl1 David W. Moore et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 86% 
favor a law requiring doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before per-
forming the procedure; 74% favor a law requiring women seeking abortions to wait twenty-
four hours before having the procedure done). 
394. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 86% favor a law requir-
ing doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before performing Lhe 
procedure). 
395. See Moore, et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting !.hat 86% favor a law requir-
ing doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion before perfonning the 
procedure). 
. 396. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 73% favor a law requir-
mg women seeking abortions to wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure 
done); see also Moore, et al., supra note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 74% favor a law 
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polls have produced similar results. In 1989, the Gordon S. Black Cor-
poration found that 63% favored a twenty-four hour waiting period 
while only 28% opposed this. 397 In 1992, Times Mirror found 81% in 
favor of such a limitation.398 In 1994, the Yankelovich Organization 
found that 73% favored a twenty-four hour waiting period before a 
doctor can administer RU-486, the "morning after" pill.399 In 1998, a 
CBS News-New York Times poll found that 79% of those polled favored a 
twenty-four hour waiting period for women seeking an abortion.400 
Hence, as the Court's early rulings on these issues were not sup-
ported by majority sentiment,401 those rulings did not survive later re-
consideration by the Court. Today, the Court's holdings are in accord 
with popular sentiment on the questions of informed consent and a 
mandatory waiting period. 402 
C. Spousal Notification and Consent 
A major area of disagreement between Supreme Court doctrine 
and public opinion is that of spousal consent and notification. For 
over twenty years, the Court has rejected statutes imposing either 
spousal consent or notification provisions, while significant majorities 
of those polled support such requirements.403 
Gallup polls during the 1990s found at least 70% of those polled 
favored spousal notification.404 Lesser-known polls have reported simi-
lar findings. A 1989 Gordon S. Black poll found that 63% of those 
polled favored a state law which would require spousal notification.405 
requiring women seeking abortions to wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure 
done). 
397. See Gordon S. Black, U.S.A. Today, Dec. 26, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in 
LEXlS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
398. See People, The Press & Politics Campaign '92, May 8, l 992, Public Opinion Online, 
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
399. See Time, CNN, Yankelovich Partners Inc., May. 20, 1994, Public Opinion Online, 
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
400. See CBS News, New York Times Poll,Jan. 15,1998, Public Opinion Online, available 
in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
401. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
402. See discussion supra Part II. B. 
403. See discussion supra Part li.C. 
404. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 73% favored a law re-
quiring that the husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an abor-
tion); see also Moore et al., supra note 383, at 29, 35 (reporting that 70% favored a law 
requiring that the husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an 
abortion) . 
405. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, July 5, 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in 
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
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Six months later, the same group found that 57% of those surveyed 
supported such a Jaw.406 Other groups, both those with ties to the 
Right to Life movement and those without ideological ties, have also 
found that a significant majority favor spousal notification.407 
Perhaps more surprising, at least two polls have found majority 
support for a Jaw that would require spousal consent as well. A 1989 
Los Angeles Times poll found that 53% of those sampled favored such a 
requirement.408 A similar Washington Post poll conducted in 1992 
found that 63% favored spousal consent as a precondition for an 
abortion. 409 
The disparity between Supreme Court doctrine and public opin-
ion over spousal rights is significant and has not changed over time. 
However, it is the only area of significant disagreement that has re-
mained consistent over time. 
D. Parental Notification and Consent 
Not long after Roe, the Supreme Court struck down Missouri's 
blanket parental consent requirement.41 0 The Court suggested the 
state might tailor a parental consent law to serve legitimate interests in 
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority.411 Since then, the 
Court has reviewed numerous state laws regulating a minor's right to 
have an abortion. The Court has upheld the law in question, whether 
it involved parental consent or merely notification, as long as the law 
provided for a judicial bypass for certain minors. 4!2 
Gallup has found consistent support of about 70% for a parental 
consent requirement.41 3 Those findings have been replicated by nu-
406. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, Dec. 26, 1989, Public Opinion Online, availahle in 
LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
407. See Wirthlin Group, Jan. 1992, Public opinion Onlin~. available in LEXIS, Market 
Library, RPOLL File (reporting that 74% favored a law requiring a woman's husband be 
notified before an abortion is performed). Wirthli.n Group is a full seJVice research pro-
vider founded by Richard Wirthlin. Wirthlin 's most notable clients are former President 
and California Governor Ronald Reagan as well as The NationaJ Right to Life Committee. 
He is widely recognized as one of the best Republican pollsters in the country today. 
408. See Los Angeles Times, March 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in LEX1S, Mar-
ket Library, RPOLL File. 
409. See Washington Post, April 1992, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Marke t 
Library, RPOLL File. 
410. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
412. See discussion supra Part II.D . 
. 413. See Hugick & Saad, supra note 393, at 5, 7 (reporting that 70% favor a law requir-
mg women under 18 to get parental consent for any abortion); see also Moore et aJ., supra 
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merous groups.414 Almost all of the polls have found support for a 
requirement of parental consent to run close to or above 70%;415 only 
a 1990 poll found support under 60%, but even there, 57% of those 
polled supported a parental consent requirement.416 
Whether the Supreme Court doctrine and polling data are en-
tirely consistent is open to debate, the reason being that the pollsters 
have not attempted to measure whether those polled would support 
the judicial bypass exception. This should not, however, obscure the 
fact that the Court has upheld parental consent laws, a holding that 
receives overwhelming public support. 
E. Use of Public Funds 
Pollsters have come to inconsistent results in efforts to measure 
public opinion about public funding of abortions. While the Supreme 
Court doctrine has consistently rejected the argument that govern-
ment has an obligation to fund abortions,417 public opinion has varied 
depending on the wording of the question asked. 
A number of major polls seem to agree with Supreme Court doc-
trine. For example, one Gallup poll found that 54% favored a state's 
right to prohibit abortions "in public hospitals unless the abortion is 
required to save a woman's life."418 A Los Angeles Times poll reported 
that 56% favored that part of the Webster decision which upheld a 
state's right to impose such a prohibition.419 Another Los Angeles Times 
poll found that 54% of those polled opposed a reformed health plan 
that would provide funding for abortions. 420 
By contrast, a number of polls have found that a majority oppose 
laws which would ban public hospitals from performing abortions. A 
note 383, at 29, 34 (reporting that 74% favor a law requiring women under 18 to get 
parental consent for any abortion). 
414. See People, The Press & Politics Campaign '92, May 8, 1992, Public Opinion Online, 
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File; American National Election Study 1992, 
April 1993, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File; Time, 
CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, july 5, 1990, Public opinion Online, available in LEXIS, 
Market Library, RPOLL File. 
415. Seeid. 
416. See Time, CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, july 5, 1990, Public Opinion Online, 
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
417. See discussion mpra Part II. E. 
418. Hugick, supra note 383, at 5, 10 (reporting that 54% favored and 43% opposed a 
law not allowing abortions w be performed in public hospitals). 
419. See Los Angeles Times, July 1989, Public Opinion Online, available in LEXIS, Market 
Library, RPOLL File. 
420. See Los Angeles Times, Oct 1993, Public Opinion Online, available in LEX IS, Market 
Library, RPOLL File. 
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1989 USA Today poll reported that 51% of those questioned opposed 
such a prohibition, while 44% supported the suggested ban:421 A simi-
lar poll concluded that 64% of the sample opposed a legal restriction 
which would prohibit "abortions from being performed in all public 
hospitals and clinics. "422 Finally, a CBS News-New York Times poll found 
that 57% opposed a prohibition against public employees or public 
hospitals from performing abortions.423 
A possible explanation for the inconsistent results is that the 
questions used in the various polls frame the issue differently. For ex-
ample, some of those responding to the CBS News-New York Times poll 
who opposed a limitation on abortions being performed in a public 
hospital may have answered differently if they had been asked 
whether they supported a requirement that public hospitals dedicate 
resources to providing aborrions. Neither the 1998 USA Today poll nor 
the CBS News-New Yom Times poll focused on the fact that requiring a 
public hospital and public employees to perform abortions requires 
the local government entity to fund those abortions. Had the ques-
tions been framed so that this premise could be understood, inconsis-
tent results may not have been produced. 
Conclusion 
The focus of this article has been on one criticism leveled at the 
Supreme Court: that its activism, in the words of Robert Bork, "is 
likely to represent an elite minority's sentiment."424 This article has 
attempted to determine whether the Court's abortion doctrine is in 
fact anti-majoritarian. Quite to the contrary, the data suggest that 
Supreme Court case law in large part reflects majoritarian sentiment. 
In recent years, conservatives have renewed a time worn attack on 
the Court that it is anti-majoritarian.425 In the words of one critic, the 
Court is a "regular participant in the 'culture wars' that divide Ameri-
cans on so many social issues. And in these ongoing conflicts, the 
Court is a systematic partisan for one side-the liberal side."426 That 
kind of powerful rhetoric can cast doubt on the Court's legitimacy 
421. See Gordon S. Black, USA Today, July 5, l 989, Public Opinion Online, avaikzble in 
LEXIS, Markel Library, RPOLL File. 
422. Time, CNN, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 10, 1989, P.ulJlic Opinio'TI Online, 
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
423. See CBS News, New York Times, July 1989, Public Opitlicn Online, available in 
LEXlS, Market Library, RPOLL File. 
424. BoRK, supra note 3, at 17. 
425. See discussion Stlflra Part I.A. 
426. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 105. 
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and has at times led to a call for limitations on the power of federal 
courts. 
Sustained attacks on the Court's legitimacy may undercut the 
Court's ability to do substantial justice in otherwise unpopular cases. 
The traditional defense of the Court, that it was intended to protect 
"discrete and insular minorities," has its limitations. Over time, the 
public will not continue to support a court that repeatedly frustrates 
popular will. 427 
While the Constitution was never intended to create a system of 
direct democracy, it built in significant limitations that prevent Article 
III courts from becoming politically unaccountable. Article III creates 
an independent judiciary with the ability to do justice in individual 
cases. At the same time, the political branches of government can in-
fluence the direction of the Court through the appointment 
process. 428 
Comparison of the Supreme Court's abortion case law with doz-
ens of public opinion polls spanning twenty-five years demonstrates 
that the Court has not abandoned the m<Uority in favor of a political 
elite. In almost every area, Court doctrine and public opinion show 
significant similarity. In fact, public opinion and Supreme Court doc-
trine have often shown far greater similarity than do the views of the 
Court's critics. 
427. See Dahl, supra note 34, at 283. 
428. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text. 
